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We consider a device-independent (DI) scenario where N parties test a generic full-correlator Bell
inequality with two inputs and two outcomes per party. By exploiting the inequality’s symmetries,
we drastically simplify the general form of the quantum state that can be considered, without loss
of generality. We then focus on the Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-Klyshko (MABK) inequality and
derive an upper bound on the maximal violation of the MABK inequality attained by an arbitrary
N -qubit state, as a function of the state’s parameters. The two results enable us to derive analytical
bounds on the von Neumann entropy of the parties’ outcomes, conditioned on the eavesdropper’s
information. These quantities are crucial for the security of most cryptographic protocols and better
bounds lead to more robust protocols. In particular, we bound the conditional entropy of a single
party’s outcome and the joint conditional entropy of two parties’ outcomes, as a function of the
MABK violation observed by three parties. We extend the former bound to N parties and prove its
tightness, while we observe that the latter bound significantly improves previous results.
INTRODUCTION
Stimulated by data security concerns and by commercial
opportunities, several companies and governments are in-
creasingly investing resources in quantum cryptography
technologies [1, 2]. Those include, most prominently,
quantum key distribution (QKD) [3–10] and quantum
random number generation [11, 12]. The former enables
two parties to establish an information-theoretically se-
cure shared key, while the latter is considered the only
source of genuine randomness. In the context of emerg-
ing quantum networks [13–19], the task of QKD can be
generalized to quantum conference key agreement (CKA)
[20–26]. Here, N parties establish a common secret key
to securely broadcast messages within their network, as
proved recently in the first CKA experiment [27]. How-
ever, it is challenging to ensure that the assumptions on
the implementation of these cryptographic tasks are met
in practice, hence jeopardizing their security.
This led to the development of device-independent (DI)
cryptographic protocols, whose security holds indepen-
dently of the actual functioning of the quantum devices
and is based on the observation of a Bell inequality vio-
lation [28]. Such protocols include DIQKD [29–37] and
DICKA [38–41] schemes, where a secret key is shared
by two or more parties, respectively. Otherwise, with DI
randomness generation (DIRG) protocols [42–52] one can
generate intrinsic randomness which is guaranteed to be
private thanks to a Bell violation.
A crucial aspect of any DI protocol is the ability to
carefully estimate, from the observed Bell violation, the
minimum amount of uncertainty that a potential eaves-
dropper, Eve, could have about the protocol’s outputs.
Indeed, this quantity determines the length of the se-
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cret random bitstring that can be distilled from the
protocol’s outputs. Eve’s uncertainty is often quanti-
fied by an appropriate conditional von Neumann entropy
[6, 31, 32, 36], relative to the effective state shared by the
parties in a generic round of the protocol. The goal is to
minimize the entropy over all the possible states yielding
the observed Bell inequality violation.
This task can be carried out numerically, however the
available techniques [53–55] focus on minimizing a lower
bound on the von Neumann entropy, namely the min-
entropy [6], thus producing sub-optimal results. Here
we follow an analytical approach that partially fixes the
generic state shared by the parties without loss of gener-
ality, by exploiting the symmetries of the considered Bell
inequality. The resulting state depends on a small num-
ber of parameters, allowing a direct minimization of the
conditional von Neumann entropy [32]. This results in
a tight bound of the eavesdropper’s uncertainty, which
directly translates to an increased performance of the
protocol. To the best of our knowledge, such an ana-
lytical procedure has only been developed by Pironio et
al. [32] in the case of two parties testing the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [56].
In this work we develop a similar analytical procedure,
applicable to a broad class of DI scenarios. Specifically,
we consider N parties, each equipped with two measure-
ment settings with binary outcomes, testing a generic
full-correlator Bell inequality –i.e. an inequality where
each correlator involves every party [57]. Without loss
of generality, we reduce the density matrix of the generic
state shared by the N parties to a 2N × 2N diagonal ma-
trix, except for 2N−1 −N purely imaginary off-diagonal
terms. This means, for instance, that three parties share
a state completely determined by only eight independent
parameters (one is removed due to normalization). No-
tably, we recover the result of Pironio et al. when N = 2.
We then focus on the Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-
Klyshko (MABK) inequality [58–60] and derive an an-
alytical bound on the maximal violation of the MABK
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
14
26
3v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
29
 A
pr
 20
20
2inequality attained by an arbitrary N -qubit state, as a
function of the state’s parameters. This is a result of in-
dependent interest, which generalizes the bound for the
bipartite case of [61] and constitutes, to our knowledge,
the first of this kind valid for an arbitrary N -qubit state.
By combining the results on the state reduction and
on the MABK violation upper bound, we obtain ana-
lytical bounds on relevant conditional von Neumann en-
tropies when three parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, test
the MABK inequality. Specifically, we obtain a tight
lower bound on the von Neumann entropy of Alice’s out-
come conditioned on the eavesdropper’s information. We
extend the bound to N parties by showing that it coin-
cides with one derived previously [62] on completely dif-
ferent grounds and with no allegation of tightness. The
bound can find potential application in DIRG based on
multipartite nonlocality. We also provide a heuristic ar-
gument for which full-correlator Bell inequalities, such as
the MABK inequality, are unlikely to be employed in any
DICKA protocol.
In the same tripartite context, we derive a lower bound
on the joint conditional von Neumann entropy of Alice
and Bob’s outcomes, which substantially improves the
result derived in [48], where the authors bound the cor-
responding min-entropy. The derived bound can be em-
ployed in proving the security of DI global randomness
generation schemes.
RESULTS
Reduction of the N-party quantum state
Consider a DI scenario with N parties, denoted
Alice1,. . . ,AliceN . The parties test a generic full-
correlator Bell inequality [28, 57] where each of them can
choose among two measurement settings with binary out-
comes. We identify this as the (N, 2, 2) DI scenario. We
assume the setup to be characterized by an eavesdrop-
per, Eve, distributing an unknown quantum state to the
parties, and by unknown dichotomic observables A(i)x rep-
resenting the possible measurements settings (x = 0, 1)
for each party (i = 1, . . . , N). Then, the considered Bell
inequality is a linear combination of full-correlators of the
form: 〈
A(1)x1 · · ·A(N)xN
〉
. (1)
From the observed Bell violation, the parties could quan-
tify Eve’s uncertainty on some of their outcomes by com-
puting an appropriate conditional von Neumann entropy.
With this result, they could enhance their outcomes’ pri-
vacy (privacy amplification [6]) and use them for various
cryptographic tasks (e.g. DICKA or DIRG).
Here we present a fundamental result which enables
a direct computation of the conditional von Neumann
entropy of interest.
We first define the GHZ basis [20] for the Hilbert space
of N qubits as follows.
Definition 1. The GHZ basis for the set of N -qubit
states is composed of the following 2N states:
|ψσ,~u〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |~u〉+ (−1)σ |1〉 |~¯u〉) , (2)
where σ ∈ {0, 1} while ~u ∈ {0, 1}N−1 and ~¯u = ~1 ⊕ ~u are
(N − 1)-bit strings. In particular, for a three-qubit state,
the GHZ basis reads:
|ψi,j,k〉 = 1√
2
(|0, j, k〉+ (−1)i |1, j¯, k¯〉) i, j, k ∈ {0, 1},
(3)
where the bar over a bit indicates its negation.
We can now state the first major result of this work,
the proof of which is reported in the Methods section.
Theorem 1. Consider N parties testing an (N, 2, 2) full-
correlator Bell inequality. It is not restrictive to assume
that, in each round, Eve distributes a mixture
∑
α pαρα
of N -qubit states ρα, together with a flag |α〉 (known to
her) which determines the measurements performed on
ρα given the parties’ inputs. Without loss of generality,
the measurements performed by each device on ρα are
binary projective measurements in the (x, y)-plane of the
Bloch sphere. Moreover, each state ρα is diagonal in the
GHZ basis, except for some purely imaginary off-diagonal
terms:
ρα =
∑
~u∈{0,1}N−1
[λα0~u|ψ0,~u〉〈ψ0,~u |+λα1~u|ψ1,~u〉〈ψ1,~u |
+isα~u (|ψ0,~u〉〈ψ1,~u |−|ψ1,~u〉〈ψ0,~u |)] , (4)
Finally, N arbitrary off-diagonal terms sα~u can be as-
sumed to be zero. Independently, N pairs of the form
(λα0~u, λ
α
1~u) can be arbitrarily ordered (e.g. λ
α
0~u ≥ λα1~u).
In the following we focus our analysis on a given state
ρα. Hence, for ease of notation we drop the symbol α in
the parameters related to the state ρα (e.g. λα0,~u and s
α
~u)
when there is no ambiguity.
Note that, for N = 2, we recover the result of [32]. By
applying Theorem 1 to the case of N = 3 parties, it is not
restrictive to assume that they share a mixture of states
ρα, with the following matrix representation in the GHZ
basis:
ρα =

λ000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 λ100 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 λ001 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 λ101 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 λ010 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 λ110 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 λ011 is
0 0 0 0 0 0 −is λ111

.
(5)
3The eigenvalues of (5) are given by:
ρijk = λijk (j, k) 6= (1, 1)
ρi11 =
λ011 + λ111 + (−1)i
√
(λ011 − λ111)2 + 4s2
2
. (6)
Upper bound on MABK violation
The MABK inequality [58–60] is one possible generaliza-
tion of the CHSH inequality [56] and is derived on the
following MABK operator.
Definition 2. The MABK operator MN is defined by
recursion [62, 63]:
M2 = GCHSH(A
(1)
0 , A
(1)
1 , A
(2)
0 , A
(2)
1 )
≡ A(1)0 ⊗A(2)0 +A(1)0 ⊗A(2)1 +A(1)1 ⊗A(2)0
−A(1)1 ⊗A(2)1
MN =
1
2
GCHSH(MN−1,MN−1, A
(N)
0 , A
(N)
1 ), (7)
where A(j)i (i = 0, 1) is the i-th binary observable of
Alicej and where Ml is the operator obtained from Ml by
replacing every observable A(j)i with A
(j)
1−i. For N = 3,
the MABK operator reads:
M3 =A0 ⊗B0 ⊗ C1 +A0 ⊗B1 ⊗ C0
+A1 ⊗B0 ⊗ C0 −A1 ⊗B1 ⊗ C1 (8)
where Ax, By and Cz are Alice’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s
observables, respectively.
Then the N -partite MABK inequality reads as follows:
〈MN 〉 = Tr[MNρ] ≤

2, classical bound
2N/2, GME threshold
2(N+1)/2 quantum bound
(9)
where MN is the MABK operator and a violation of the
GME threshold implies that the parties share a genuine
multipartite entangled (GME) state.
The second major result is an upper bound on the max-
imal MABK violation attained by a given N -qubit state.
The bound is state-dependent, i.e. it bounds the max-
imal violation that can be achieved with a given state
and is tight on certain classes of states (proof and tight-
ness conditions in Methods). This is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first bound of such kind for an N -partite
Bell inequality. Recently, the authors in [64] derived a
similar bound in the N = 3 case. Our bound is tight on
a larger set of states (discussion in Methods) and is valid
for general N .
Theorem 2. The maximum violation Mρ of the
N -partite MABK inequality (9), attained by an N -qubit
state ρ, satisfies
Mρ ≤ 2
√
t0 + t1 (10)
where t0 and t1 are the largest and second-to-the-largest
eigenvalues of the matrix TρTTρ , where Tρ is the correla-
tion matrix of ρ.
We define the correlation matrix of an N -qubit state
as follows.
Definition 3. The correlation matrix of an N -qubit state
ρ, Tρ, is a square or rectangular matrix defined by the
elements [Tρ]ij = Tr[ρσν1 ⊗ . . .⊗ σνN ] such that:
i = 1 +
dN/2e∑
k=1
3dN/2e−k(νk − 1)
j = 1 +
N∑
k=dN/2e+1
3N−k(νk − 1) (11)
where ν1, . . . , νN ∈ {1, 2, 3}, σ1 = X, σ2 = Y and σ3 =
Z are the Pauli matrices and dxe returns the smallest
integer greater or equal to x.
By applying Theorem 2 to the state ρα in (5), we ob-
tain an upper bound on the maximal MABK violation
Mα achievable on ρα.
Corollary 1. For a tripartite state ρα of the form given
in (5), the maximal violationMα of the MABK inequal-
ity satisfies:
Mα ≤M↑α = 4
√√√√ 1∑
j,k=0
(ρ0jk − ρ1jk)2, (12)
where {ρijk} are the eigenvalues of the state ρα, as spec-
ified in (6).
In the Methods section, we provide the tightness condi-
tions (75) for which the upper bound in (12) is achieved.
Tight conditional entropy bound
Consider the (3, 2, 2) DI scenario where Alice, Bob and
Charlie test the tripartite MABK inequality in order
to quantify Eve’s uncertainty on Alice’s outcome X,
by computing the conditional von Neumann entropy
H(X|E). We emphasize that, in a DIRG protocol, the
entropyH(X|E) determines the asymptotic rate of secret
random bits extracted by applying privacy amplification
[6] on Alice’s X outcomes [65, 66]. Similarly, in DICKA
the secret key rate is determined by H(X|E) decreased
by the amount of classical information disclosed by the
parties in the other steps of the protocol [40, 62, 65].
We derive a tight analytical lower bound onH(X|E) as
a function of the observed MABK violation. Theorem 1
guarantees that we can restrict the computation of the
conditional entropy H(X|Etot) over a mixture of states
ρα of the form (5). We emphasize that the total informa-
tion Etot = EΞ available to Eve includes the knowledge
4of the flag Ξ which carries the value of α (see Methods).
The goal is to lower bound the conditional entropy with
a function F of the observed MABK violation m. The
bound is tight if, for any given MABK violation m, there
exist a quantum state and a set of measurements that
achieve that violation and whose conditional entropy is
exactly given by F (m).
Thanks to Theorem 1, we can be express the condi-
tional entropy H(X|Etot) as follows:
H(X|Etot) =
∑
α
pαH(X|EΞ = α)
=
∑
α
pαH(X|E)ρα , (13)
as a matter of fact the state on which H(X|Etot) is com-
puted is a classical-quantum state (see Eq. (38) in Meth-
ods). At the same time, the observed violation m can be
expressed as:
m =
∑
α
pαmα. (14)
In (13), the entropy H(X|E)ρα is the conditional entropy
of Alice’s outcome given that Eve distributed the state
ρα, while pα is the probability distribution of the mixture
prepared by Eve. In (14), mα is the violation that the
parties would observe had they shared the state ρα in
every round of the protocol.
We then aim at lower bounding H(X|E)ρα with a con-
vex function F of the MABK violation mα:
H(X|E)ρα ≥ F (mα). (15)
By combining (13), (14), (15) and the convexity of F ,
one can obtain the desired lower bound on H(X|Etot) as
a function of the observed violation m:
H(X|Etot) ≥ F (m). (16)
In the following we show in detail how to obtain the de-
sired function F . In particular, we minimize the condi-
tional entropy H(X|E)ρα over all the states ρα of the
form (5), whose observed MABK violation mα is upper
bounded by (12). Note that the eigenvectors of the state
ρα, correspondent to the eigenvalues in (6), read:
|ρijk〉 = |ψijk〉 (j, k) 6= (1, 1)
|ρ011〉 = cos(arctan q) |ψ011〉 − i sin(arctan q) |ψ111〉
|ρ111〉 = cos(arctan q) |ψ111〉 − i sin(arctan q) |ψ011〉 ,
(17)
where the parameter q is defined as:
q =
2s
λ011 − λ111 +
√
(λ011 − λ111)2 + 4s2
. (18)
By combining the freedom in ordering the diagonal ele-
ments λijk of ρα (c.f. Theorem 1) with the definition of
the eigenvalues ρijk in (6), one can impose the following
constraints on the eigenvalues:
ρ0jk ≥ ρ1jk ∀ j, k. (19)
The entropy H(X|E)ρα is computed on the classical-
quantum state:
ραXE = (EX ⊗ idE) TrBC [|φαABCE〉〈φαABCE |], (20)
where |φαABCE〉 is a purification of ρα (Eve holds the pu-
rifying system E), while EX represents Alice’s projective
measurement defined by the following projectors:
|a〉X =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)aeiϕ |1〉) a ∈ {0, 1}, (21)
where ϕ ∈ [0, 2pi] identifies the measurement direction in
the (x, y)-plane of the Bloch sphere. The entropy min-
imization is greatly simplified if, instead of minimizing
over the matrix elements {λijk} and s of ρα, one mini-
mizes over its eigenvalues {ρijk} and over q. Indeed, there
exists a bijective map linking the two sets of parameters,
defined by the relations (6) and (18). The remarkable
advantage of adopting the new variables {ρijk} and q in
the minimization of H(X|E)ρα , is that the MABK vio-
lation upper boundM↑α in (12) only depends on {ρijk}.
This allows us to first minimize the entropy over q and
ϕ without affecting the MABK violation. In particular,
one can easily verify that the entropy is minimized for
q = ϕ = 0, by using the constraints (19). In other words,
it is optimal for Eve to distribute a mixture of GHZ-
diagonal states (q = 0 implies s = 0), similarly to the
bipartite scenario studied in [32]. The resulting condi-
tional entropy reads:
H(X|E)ρα = 1−H({ρijk}) +H({ρijk + ρij¯k¯}), (22)
where the Shannon entropy of a probability distribution
{pi}i is defined as H({pi}) =
∑
i−pi log2 pi.
The final step consists in minimizing the entropy in
(22) over {ρijk} and for a given violation mα, with the
constraint given by the MABK violation upper bound
(12):
mα ≤M↑α. (23)
We perform this optimization analytically and provide
the complete proof in section IV of the Supplementary
Information.
Importantly, we show that the minimal entropy is at-
tained when equality holds in (23) and by the following
family of states for every value of the violation mα:
τ(νm) = νm|ψ0,0,0〉〈ψ0,0,0 |+(1− νm)|ψ0,1,1〉〈ψ0,1,1 |.
(24)
The parameter νm is fixed by the violation mα via (23)
evaluated with the equals sign:
mα =M↑τ (νm) = 4
√
2ν2m − 2νm + 1, (25)
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Figure 1. Tight analytical lower bound on the conditional
entropy H(X|E) as a function of the MABK inequality viola-
tion (Eq. (28)) observed by three parties. We notice that Eve
has no uncertainty on Alice’s outcome X for violations below
the genuine multipartite entanglement (GME) threshold.
where we used (12) to compute the upper bound on the
violation. The lower bound on the conditional entropy
H(X|E)α is thus given by the entropy of the states in
(24):
H(X|E)α ≥ F (mα) := H(X|E)τ (νm) (26)
The entropy of the states in (24) is easily computed from
(22) and can be expressed in terms of the observed vio-
lation by reverting (25). We obtain:
F (mα) = 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
m2α
8
− 1
)
, (27)
where h(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the bi-
nary entropy. Finally, the lower bound (27) is a convex
function, hence we can employ it in (16) and obtain the
desired lower bound on H(X|Etot) as a function of the
observed MABK violation:
H(X|Etot) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
m2
8
− 1
)
. (28)
In figure 1, we plot the lower bound on the conditional
entropy derived in (28), as a function of the observed
violation of the MABK inequality. We notice that the
minimized conditional entropy is zero for violations below
the GME threshold of 2
√
2. This means that GME is
a necessary feature to guarantee private randomness of
Alice’s outcome in a tripartite MABK scenario.
Moreover, the lower bound on the conditional entropy
in (28) is tight for any given observed violation. Indeed
for every violation m, there exists a state τ(νm) whose
entropy coincides with the lower bound and whose max-
imal MABK violation is equal to m. As a matter of fact,
the tightness conditions (75) of the MABK violation up-
per bound (12) (see Methods) are satisfied by the states
τ(νm), implying thatM↑τ =Mτ .
A lower bound on H(X|E) as a function of the MABK
inequality violation is also derived in [62], for the gen-
eral N -party scenario. However, we emphasize that the
bound in [62] is based on a completely different approach
and with no allegation of optimality. The conditional
entropy bound obtained in [62] reads:
H(X|Etot) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
m2
2N
− 1
)
, (29)
where m is the observed violation of the N -partite
MABK inequality (9).
Surprisingly, the lower bound (29) for N = 3 coincides
with the tight bound (28) obtained in this work. This
observation proves the tightness of the bound (29) in the
N = 3 case. We further verify that the bound (29) is
actually tight for every number of parties N . In order
to do so, we show that the bound (29) is attained by
the following family of states that generalizes (24) to N -
parties:
τ(ν) = ν|ψ0,~0〉〈ψ0,~0 |+(1− ν)|ψ0,~1〉〈ψ0,~1 |. (30)
In particular, by combining the conditional entropy and
the maximal MABK violation of (30) similarly to what
is done in the N = 3 case, we derive exactly the bound
in (29). Note that the family of states (30) saturates
(10), as they satisfy the tightness conditions of Theorem 2
given in Eqs. (III.75) and (III.80) of the Supplementary
Information. In this way we prove that also (29) is a
tight bound.
Finally, we remark that the tight entropy bound (29)
is only defined for m ≥ 2N/2, that is only for violations
above the GME threshold. Since private randomness of
a party’s outcome is a prerequisite of any DICKA proto-
col, it is an open question whether GME is a necessary
ingredient for DICKA.
Besides, in the next section we argue on the appar-
ent incompatibility of full-correlator Bell inequalities and
DICKA protocols.
Full-correlator Bell inequalities and DICKA
We provide an heuristic argument on why any full-
correlator Bell inequality, such as the MABK inequality,
seems to be useless for DICKA protocols. We hope that
this fundamental question can spark the interest of the
community towards more conclusive results.
Any DICKA protocol is characterized by two essential
ingredients: a violation of a multipartite Bell inequality
to ensure secrecy of Alice’s outcomes and correlated out-
comes among all the parties yielding the conference key.
Since a part of Alice’s outcomes form the secret key, one
of the measurements she uses to assess the violation of
the inequality must be the same used for key generation
[32, 41]. Note that, unlike Alice, the other parties are
equipped with an additional measurement option solely
used for key generation.
6It is known that every full-correlator Bell inequality is
maximally violated by the GHZ state [57]. Moreover, the
only multiqubit state leading to perfectly correlated and
random outcomes among all the parties is the GHZ state,
when the parties measure in the Z basis [20].
However, a GHZ state maximally violates a full-
correlator Bell inequality when the measurements are
chosen such that the resulting inequality (modulo rear-
rangements) is only composed of expectation values of
GHZ stabilizers, which acquire the extremal values ±1.
Moreover, the stabilizers appearing in the inequality do
not act trivially on any qubit –i.e. do not contain the
identity– due to the full-correlator structure of the in-
equality. We call such stabilizers “full-stabilizers” for ease
of comprehension.
The problem is that none of the N -partite GHZ state
full-stabilizers, for N odd, contains the Z operator [67].
This implies that, in order to maximally violate the in-
equality, Alice’s measurement directions are orthogonal
to Z. Since one of these measurements is also used to gen-
erate her raw key, she would obtain totally uncorrelated
outcomes with the rest of the parties (perfect correlations
are only obtained with a GHZ state when measuring Z).
This causes the unwanted situation of having maximal
violation and perfect correlations among the parties’ key
bits as mutually exclusive conditions. Since both condi-
tions are required in a DICKA protocol, the above argu-
ment constitutes an initial evidence that full-correlator
Bell inequalities are not suited for DICKA protocols.
A similar argument holds when the number of parties
N is even (N > 2). As a matter of fact, in this case there
exists only one GHZ full-stabilizer which contains the Z
operator, namely: Z⊗N . If 〈Z⊗N 〉 were to appear in the
rearranged inequality expression, there should be at least
another correlator containing at least one Z operator.
Indeed, if each observable in a correlator never appears
again in any other term of the inequality, that correlator
is useless since Eve could assign to it any value (Eve is
supposed to know the inequality being tested). The lack
of any other full-stabilizer containing the Z operator pre-
vents having a second correlator containing Z, thus ex-
cluding the term 〈Z⊗N 〉 in the first place. Therefore,
also in the N -even case Alice’s measurements leading to
maximal violation are orthogonal to Z, yielding uncorre-
lated raw key bits. We remark that the N = 2 case is
peculiar since the low number of parties allows 〈ZZ〉 (ob-
tained from the term 〈A1(B0 −B1)〉 in the inequality) to
appear just once in the CHSH inequality [56].
It is worth mentioning that in Ref. [68] the apparent
incompatibility of the MABK inequality with a DICKA
protocol was already discussed. In particular, it is shown
in the tripartite case that there exists no honest imple-
mentation such that the parties’ outcomes are perfectly
correlated and at the same time the MABK inequality is
violated above the GME threshold, which is a necessary
condition as we pointed out above.
Despite the concerns on the use of MABK inequali-
ties in DICKA protocols, the results of this paper are
still of fundamental interest for DIRG [42–52] based on
multiparty nonlocality. As a further application, in the
following we improve the bound on Eve’s uncertainty of
Alice and Bob’s outcomes derived in [48].
Joint conditional entropy bound
Consider the same DI scenario introduced in section
“Tight conditional entropy bound”, and suppose that Eve
wishes to jointly guess the measurement outcomes X and
Y of Alice and Bob, respectively. This scenario may oc-
cur in DIRG protocols where the parties are assumed to
be co-located and collaborate to generate global secret
randomness [48, 65]. We estimate Eve’s uncertainty by
providing a lower bound on the conditional von Neumann
entropy H(XY |E)ρα , as a function of the MABK viola-
tion. The entropy is computed on the following quantum
state:
ραXY E = (EX ⊗ EY ⊗ idE) TrC [|φαABCE〉〈φαABCE |], (31)
where the maps EX and EY represent Alice’s and Bob’s
measurement, respectively, and are defined by the follow-
ing projectors:
|a〉X =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)aeiϕA |1〉) a ∈ {0, 1}
|b〉Y =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)beiϕB |1〉) b ∈ {0, 1}. (32)
The lower bound on H(XY |E)ρα is derived by minimiz-
ing the entropy over the eigenvalues {ρijk} of ρα and
over q given in (18) with the same argument used for
H(X|E)ρα , having upper bounded the observed MABK
violation with (12).
We perform a fully-analytical optimization which is re-
ported in section V of the Supplementary Information.
Notably, in analogy with the case of H(X|E)ρα , we ver-
ify that the entropy is minimized when q = ϕA = ϕB = 0,
i.e. when ρα is a GHZ-diagonal state and both Alice and
Bob measure in the X basis.
The analytical lower bound on H(XY |E)ρα reads:
H(XY |E)ρα ≥ G(mα), (33)
where:
G(mα) := 2−H ({1− 3f(mα), f(mα), f(mα), f(mα)}) ,
(34)
and where the function f is defined as:
f(mα) =
1
4
−
√
3
24
√
m2α − 4. (35)
Similarly to the case of H(X|E)ρα , we can exploit the
convexity of the function in (34) to lower bound the con-
ditional entropy of the global state prepared by Eve:
H(XY |Etot) ≥ G(m), (36)
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Figure 2. Analytical lower bound on the conditional von Neu-
mann entropy H(XY |E) (green line, Eq. (36)) as a function
of the MABK violation observed by three parties. We com-
pare it to the lower bound on the conditional min-entropy
Hmin(XY |E) derived in [48] (magenta line). Our bound dra-
matically improves the one in [48] since it directly bounds
the von Neumann entropy. Unlike the case of H(X|E), Eve’s
uncertainty on Alice and Bob’s outcomes is nonzero even for
violations below the GME threshold.
where m is the violation observed by Alice, Bob and
Charlie and G(m) is the function defined in (34).
The bound in (36) is plotted in figure 2 (green line),
together with the tight lower bound on the correspondent
min-entropy obtained in [48] (magenta line).
We point out the dramatic improvement in certifying
device-independently the privacy of Alice and Bob’s out-
comes with our lower bound on the conditional von Neu-
mann entropy H(XY |E), as opposed to bounding the
conditional min-entropy Hmin(XY |E).
The min-entropy is often used to lower bound the von-
Neumann entropy in DI protocols, since it can be di-
rectly estimated using the statistics of the measurement
outcomes. In general it holds that H ≥ Hmin [69]. How-
ever, bounding the von Neumann entropy with the min-
entropy can be far from optimal, as in the case analyzed
here (see figure 2).
From figure 2, we also observe that the conditional
entropy of the outcomesX and Y is nonzero for violations
below the GME threshold unlike the entropy of Alice’s
outcome X (c.f. figure 1).
Finally we remark that, differently from the bound on
H(X|E) given in (28), we cannot infer the tightness of
our analytical bound on H(XY |E). This is discussed in
detail in section V of the Supplementary Information.
DISCUSSION
The security of device-independent (DI) cryptographic
protocols is based on the ability to bound the entropy of
the protocols’ outcomes, conditioned on the eavesdrop-
per’s knowledge, by a Bell inequality violation. To this
aim, we considered a DI scenario where N parties test a
generic full-correlator Bell inequality, with two measure-
ment settings and two outcomes per party. We proved, in
this context, that it is not restrictive to reduce the most
general quantum state tested by the parties to a mixture
of simple N -qubit states. Our result reduces to the only
other one of this kind [32] when N = 2.
In order to obtain the entropic bounds, we proved an
analytical upper bound on the maximal violation of the
MABK inequality achieved by a given N -qubit state,
which is tight on certain classes of states. Our bound
generalizes the known result [61] valid for the CHSH in-
equality to an arbitrary number of parties. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first bound on the maximal
violation of a N -partite Bell inequality achievable by a
given state, expressed in terms of the state’s parameters.
These results enabled us to derive a tight analytical
lower bound on the conditional von Neumann entropy of
Alice’s outcome, when Alice, Bob and Charlie test the
tripartite MABK inequality. We also derived an analyt-
ical lower bound on the joint conditional von Neumann
entropy of Alice and Bob’s outcomes, which dramatically
improves a similar estimation made in [48] in terms of the
corresponding min-entropy. The improvement gained by
directly bounding the von Neumann entropy has direct
implications for randomness generation protocols, inas-
much it increases the fraction of random bits guaranteed
to be private.
Surprisingly, our tight lower bound on the conditional
entropy of Alice’s outcome coincides with an analogous
one [62] inferred with a completely different method-
ology, namely exploring a correspondence between the
CHSH and the MABK inequality, and with no allegation
of tightness. Moreover, we showed that the N -partite
version of the bound in [62] is actually tight for arbitrary
N .
We deduced that genuine multipartite entanglement
(GME) is necessary to guarantee the privacy of Al-
ice’s random outcome in any device-independent scenario
based on the MABK inequality. It is an open ques-
tion whether GME is a fundamental requirement for DI
conference key agreement (DICKA). In this regard, we
heuristically argued that full-correlator Bell inequalities,
such as the MABK inequality, are unlikely to be em-
ployed in any DICKA protocol. We envision further and
more conclusive results in this direction from the scien-
tific community interested in this topic.
The bounds on the conditional entropies derived in this
work can find potential application in DI randomness
generation based on multipartite nonlocality. Depending
on the application, such protocols would generate local
randomness for one party or global randomness for two
or more parties. In all cases, the privacy of the generated
random data would be ensured by entropic bounds like
the ones we derived.
Furthermore, the techniques developed in proving The-
orem 1 can inspire analogous analytical reductions of the
quantum state tested in a given Bell scenario. Indeed, of
particular interest are the Bell scenarios characterizing
8the existing DICKA protocols [40, 41], for which a result
like Theorem 1 would be the first step towards a tight
security analysis, which is still lacking.
METHODS
Here we present the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
We start by proving Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 1 is
based on three main ingredients: (i) the fact that each party
has only two inputs with two outputs allows to reduce the
analysis to qubits; (ii) the symmetries of the MABK inequal-
ity allow us to set all the marginals to zero, without changing
the MABK violation or the information available to the eaves-
dropper; (iii) the freedom in the definition of the local axes
is used to further reduce the number of free parameters. Our
proof is inspired by a similar proof given in [32]. However,
our result is valid for an arbitrary number of parties N in
the generic (N, 2, 2) DI scenario described in the main text.
Notably, for N = 2 we recover the result of [32].
Proof of Theorem 1. The first step consists in reducing the
state distributed by Eve to a convex combination of N -
qubit states. To start with, every generalized measurement
(positive-operator valued measure) can be viewed as a pro-
jective measurement in a larger Hilbert space. Since we did
not fix the Hilbert space to which the shared quantum state
belongs, we can assume without loss of generality that the
parties’ measurements are binary projective measurements.
Now one can straightforwardly apply [32, lemma 2] and state
that, at every round of the protocol, the Hilbert space on
which, say, Alice1’s measurements are acting is decomposed
as:
H = ⊕αH2α , (37)
where every subspace H2α is at most two-dimensional and
both Alice1’s projective measurements act within H2α. From
Alice1’s point of view, the measurement process consists of a
projection in one of the two-dimensional subspaces followed
by a projective measurement in that subspace (selected ac-
cording to Alice1’s input). Therefore, Eve is effectively dis-
tributing to Alice1 a direct sum of qubits at every round.
Alice1’s measurement then selects one of the qubit subspaces
and performs a projective measurement within that subspace.
Of course, since Eve fabricates the measurement device, the
projective measurements occurring in every subspace can be
predefined by Eve. Since this argument holds for every party,
Eve is effectively distributing a direct sum of N -qubit states
in each round.
Certainly, it cannot be worse for Eve to learn the flag α of
the subspace selected in a particular round before sending the
direct sum of N -qubit states to the parties. For this reason,
we can reformulate the state preparation and measurement in
a generic round of the protocol as Eve preparing a mixture
ρA1...AN =
∑
α pαρα
⊗N
i=1|α〉〈α|ξi (38)
of N -qubit states ρα, together with a set of ancillae
Ξ := {ξi}Ni=1 (known to her) which fixes the qubit measure-
ments that each party can select on ρα.
Let us now focus on one specific occurrence defined by a
given α, i.e. on one of the N -qubit states ρα. We define the
plane individuated by the two measurements of each party
to be the (x, y)-plane of the Bloch sphere. Now, we assume
without loss of generality that the statistics observed by the
parties is such that every marginal is random:〈∏
i∈P
A(i)
〉
= 0, (39)
where A(i) is any dichotomic observable of Alicei and P is any
non-empty strict subset of all the parties: P ( {1, . . . , N}. In-
deed, if this is not the case, the parties can perform the follow-
ing classical procedure on their outcomes which enforces the
requirement in Eq. (39): “Alice1 and Alicei flip their outcome
with probability 1/2”, repeated for every i = 2, . . . , N . This
procedure does not change the observed Bell violation since an
even number of flips occurs at every time, thus leaving the cor-
relators (1) composing the Bell inequality unchanged. More-
over, it requires classical communication between the parties
which we assume to be known by Eve.
Since the observed statistics always satisfies (39), we can
imagine that it is Eve herself who performs the classical flip-
ping on the outputs in place of the parties. To this aim, Eve
could apply the following map to the state ρ she prepared,
before distributing it:
ρ 7→ ρ¯ = ◦Ni=2Di(ρ), (40)
where the composition operator in (40) represents the succes-
sive application of the following operations
Di(ρ) = 1
2
ρ+
1
2
Z1ZiρZ
†
1Z
†
i , (41)
with Zi representing the Pauli operator σz applied to party
number i. Note that the application of Z prior to measure-
ment flips the outcome of a measurement in the (x, y)-plane.
Thus, by applying the map in (40), Eve is distributing a
state which automatically satisfies the condition (39). We can
safely assume that Eve implements the map in (40) since this
is not disadvantageous to her. As a matter of fact, her uncer-
tainty on the parties’ outcomes, quantified by the conditional
von Neumann entropy, does not increase when she sends the
state ρ¯ instead of ρ. We provide a detailed proof of this fact
in section I of the Supplementary Information. Therefore, it
is not restrictive to assume that the parties receive the state
(40) from Eve, which can be recast as:
ρ¯ =
1
2N−1
bN
2
c∑
n=0
∑
~i∈I(n)
Z
~iρZ
~i, (42)
with
I(n) = {~i ∈ {0, 1}N : H(~i) = 2n}, (43)
Z
~i =
N⊗
j=1
Z
ij
j , (44)
where the Hamming weight H(~i) of a bit string ~i returns the
total number of bits that are equal to one and bxc returns the
greatest integer smaller or equal to x.
By expressing the initial generic state ρ in the GHZ basis:
ρ =
∑
~u,~v∈{0,1}N−1
1∑
σ,τ=0
ρ(σ~u)(τ~v) |ψσ,~u〉 〈ψτ,~v| , (45)
9where ρ(σ~u)(τ~v) ∈ C and by substituting it into (42), we notice
that the state ρ¯ is greatly simplified in the GHZ basis. In
particular, all the coherences between states of the GHZ basis
relative to different vectors ~u are null:
ρ¯ =
∑
~u∈{0,1}N−1
1∑
σ,τ=0
ρ(σ~u)(τ~v) |ψσ,~u〉 〈ψτ,~u| . (46)
This means that the matrix representation of ρ¯ is block-
diagonal in the GHZ basis. By relabeling the non-zero matrix
coefficients, we represent ρ¯ as follows:
ρ¯ =
⊕
~u∈{0,1}N−1
[
λ0~u r~u + is~u
r~u − is~u λ1~u
]
, (47)
where λj~u, r~u and s~u are real numbers. The number of free
parameters characterizing (47) can be further reduced by ex-
ploiting the remaining degrees of freedom in the parties’ lo-
cal reference frames [32]. Indeed, although we identified the
plane containing the measurement directions to be the (x, y)-
plane for every party, they can still choose the orientation of
the axes by applying rotations R(α) along the z direction.
Consequently, the state distributed by Eve without loss of
generality is given by:
ρ¯+ =
N⊗
i=1
Ri(αi) ρ¯
N⊗
i=1
R†i (αi), (48)
where the rotation Ri(αi) acts on the Hilbert space of party
number i and reads:
Ri(αi) = cos
αi
2
id + i sin
αi
2
Zi, (49)
where “ id” is the identity operator. Similarly to ρ¯, even the
global rotation operator is block-diagonal in the GHZ basis:
N⊗
i=1
Ri(αi) =
⊕
~u∈{0,1}N−1
[
cos β(~α,~u)
2
i sin β(~α,~u)
2
i sin β(~α,~u)
2
cos β(~α,~u)
2
]
, (50)
where ~α is the vector defined by the rotation angles
{α1, . . . , αN} and β is a function of ~α and ~u defined as:
β(~α, ~u) = α1 +
∑N−1
j=1 (−1)ujαj+1. (51)
This fact greatly simplifies the calculation in (48), as it al-
lows to multiply the matrices (47) and (50) block-by-block.
The resulting block-diagonal matrix representing the state
distributed by Eve reads:
ρ¯+ =
⊕
~u∈{0,1}N−1
[
λ′0~u r~u + is
′
~u
r~u − is′~u λ′1~u
]
(52)
where the new matrix coefficients are given by:
λ′0~u =
1
2
[λ0~u + λ1~u + (λ0~u − λ1~u) cosβ(~α, ~u)
+2s~u sinβ(~α, ~u)] (53)
s′~u =s~u cosβ(~α, ~u)− 1
2
(λ0~u − λ1~u) sinβ(~α, ~u) (54)
λ′1~u =
1
2
[λ0~u + λ1~u − (λ0~u − λ1~u) cosβ(~α, ~u)
−2s~u sinβ(~α, ~u)] . (55)
From (54) we deduce that choosing the rotation angles
α1, . . . , αN such that the following linear constraint is veri-
fied:
α1 +
∑N−1
j=1 (−1)ujαj+1 = arctan
2s~u
λ0~u − λ1~u , (56)
sets the corresponding imaginary part in (52) to zero: s′~u = 0.
However, we can only impose N constraints like (56) on the N
rotation angles, thus we are able to arbitrarily set to zero N
terms like s~u in (52). Moreover, by applying further rotations
(note that the composition of rotations is still a rotation) such
that:
α′1 +
∑N−1
j=1 (−1)ujα′j+1 = pi, (57)
we can exchange the diagonal terms in (52): λ′0~u = λ1~u and
λ′1~u = λ0~u. This allows us to arbitrarily order up to N pairs
(λ0~u, λ1~u), for the same argument as above. Note that the
blocks with ordered pairs are in general independent from the
blocks with null imaginary parts. It is also possible to impose
both conditions on the same block: applying (57) in (54) does
not introduce a non-zero imaginary part s′~u, if the imaginary
part was previously set to zero (s~u = 0) with (56).
Finally we construct the state ρ¯− starting from ρ¯+ given in
(52) by replacing r~u with −r~u:
ρ¯− =
⊕
~u∈{0,1}N−1
[
λ′0~u −r~u + is′~u
−r~u − is′~u λ′1~u
]
. (58)
We observe that the two states ρ¯± yield the same measure-
ment statistics and provide Eve with the same information
–i.e. their conditional entropies coincide. Additionally, it is
not disadvantageous for Eve to prepare a balanced mixture of
ρ¯+ and ρ¯−, rather than preparing one of the two states with
certainty. A detailed proof of these observations is given in
section II of the Supplementary Information.
We conclude that it is not restrictive to assume that Eve
distributes to the parties a mixture of N -qubit states ρα to-
gether with an ancillary system fixing the parties’ measure-
ments. Each state ρα is represented by the following block
diagonal matrix in the GHZ basis:
ρα =
ρ¯+ + ρ¯−
2
=
⊕
~u∈{0,1}N−1
[
λ0~u is~u
−is~u λ1~u
]
, (59)
where the diagonal elements of N arbitrary blocks are ordered
and the off-diagonal elements of N blocks, chosen indepen-
dently from the previous ones, are zero. This concludes the
proof.
We now present the proof of Theorem 2, which generalizes
the analogous result valid in the bipartite case for the CHSH
inequality [61]. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the
only existing upper bound on the violation of the N -partite
MABK inequality by an arbitrary N -qubit state, expressed
as a function of the state’s parameters. Note that an upper
bound on the violation of the tripartite MABK inequality
was recently derived in [64]. However, here we show that our
bound is tight on a broader class of states and valid for an
arbitrary number of parties. In order to prove Theorem 2
we make use of the following Lemma 1, which generalizes an
analogous result in [61] to rectangular matrices of arbitrary
dimensions. The proof of Lemma 1 is reported in section III
of the Supplementary Information.
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Lemma 1. Let Q be an m × n real matrix and let ‖~v‖ be
the Euclidean norm of vectors ~v ∈ Rk, for k = m,n. Finally,
let “·” indicate both the scalar product and the matrix-vector
multiplication. Then
max
~c⊥~c ′ s.t.
‖~c‖=‖~c ′‖=1
[
‖Q · ~c‖2 + ∥∥Q · ~c ′∥∥2] = u1 + u2 , (60)
where u1 and u2 are the largest and second-to-the-largest
eigenvalues of U ≡ QTQ, respectively.
For illustration purposes, here we report the proof of The-
orem 2 for the case of N = 3 parties. The full proof is given
in section III of the Supplementary Information.
Proof of Theorem 2 for N = 3. We describe the parties’ ob-
servables as projective measurements on their respective
qubit. Thus they can be represented as follows:
Ax = ~ax · ~σ, By = ~by · ~σ, and Cz = ~cz · ~σ, (61)
where ~ax,~by,~cz are unit vectors in R3 and where σ1 = X,σ2 =
Y and σ3 = Z. We can then express the tripartite MABK
operator (8) as follows:
M3 =
3∑
i,j,k=1
Mijkσi ⊗ σj ⊗ σk, (62)
where we defined
Mijk ≡ a0ib0jc1k + a0ib1jc0k + a1ib0jc0k − a1ib1jc1k. (63)
A generic 3-qubit state can be expressed in the Pauli basis
as follows
ρ =
1
8
3∑
µ,ν,γ=0
Λµνγσµ ⊗ σν ⊗ σγ , (64)
with Λµνγ = Tr[ρσµ⊗σν⊗σγ ] and σ0 = id. With the MABK
operator in (62), the MABK expectation value on the generic
3-qubit state in (64) is given by:
〈M3〉ρ = Tr(M3ρ)
=
1
8
3∑
i,j,k=1
3∑
µ,ν,γ=0
MijkΛµνγ Tr (σiσµ ⊗ σjσν ⊗ σkσγ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
8δi,µδj,νδk,γ
=
3∑
i,j,k=1
MijkΛijk. (65)
By recalling the correlation matrix of a tripartite state
(c.f. Definition 3), the MABK expectation value in (65) can
be recast as follows:
〈M3〉ρ = (~a0 ⊗~b1 + ~a1 ⊗~b0)T · Tρ · ~c0
+ (~a0 ⊗~b0 − ~a1 ⊗~b1)T · Tρ · ~c1. (66)
Finally, the maximum violationMρ of the MABK inequality
achieved by an arbitrary 3-qubit state is obtained by opti-
mizing (66) over all possible observables that the parties can
choose to measure:
Mρ = max
~ai,~bi,~ci s.t.
‖~ai‖=‖~bi‖=‖~ci‖=1
(~a0 ⊗~b1 + ~a1 ⊗~b0)T · Tρ · ~c0
+ (~a0 ⊗~b0 − ~a1 ⊗~b1)T · Tρ · ~c1. (67)
Let us now evaluate the norm of the composite vectors in (67):∥∥∥~a0 ⊗~b1 + ~a1 ⊗~b0∥∥∥2 = 2 + 2 cos θa cos θb︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡cos θab
= 4 cos2
(
θab
2
)
, (68)
where θa (θb) is the angle between vectors ~a0 and ~a1 (~b0 and
~b1). Similarly,∥∥∥~a0 ⊗~b0 − ~a1 ⊗~b1∥∥∥2 = 4 sin2(θab
2
)
. (69)
We then define normalized vectors ~v0 and ~v1 such that
~a0 ⊗~b1 + ~a1 ⊗~b0 = 2 cos
(
θab
2
)
~v0, (70)
~a0 ⊗~b0 − ~a1 ⊗~b1 = 2 sin
(
θab
2
)
~v1. (71)
It can be easily checked that the normalized vectors ~v0 and
~v1 are also orthogonal. By substituting the definitions (70)
and (71) into the maximal violation of the MABK inequality
(67), we can upper bound the latter as follows:
Mρ ≤ max
~ci,~vi,θab s.t.
‖~ci‖=‖~vi‖=1∧~v0⊥~v1
2 cos
(
θab
2
)
~vT0 · Tρ · ~c0
+ 2 sin
(
θab
2
)
~vT1 · Tρ · ~c1. (72)
The inequality in (72) is due to the fact that now the optimiza-
tion is over arbitrary orthonormal vectors ~v0, ~v1 and angle θab,
while originally the optimization was over variables satisfying
the structure imposed by (70) and (71). We now simplify the
r.h.s. of (72) to obtain the theorem claim. In particular, we
optimize over the unit vectors ~c0 and ~c1 by choosing them
in the directions of TTρ · ~v0 and TTρ · ~v1, respectively, and we
also optimize over θab by exploiting the fact that the general
expression A cos θ + B sin θ is maximized to
√
A2 +B2 for
θ = arctanB/A:
Mρ ≤ max
~vi,θab s.t.
‖~vi‖=1∧~v0⊥~v1
2
[
cos
(
θab
2
)∥∥∥TTρ · ~v0∥∥∥
+ sin
(
θab
2
)∥∥∥TTρ · ~v1∥∥∥]
= max
~vi s.t.
‖~vi‖=1∧~v0⊥~v1
2
√∥∥TTρ · ~v0∥∥2 + ∥∥TTρ · ~v1∥∥2. (73)
Finally, by applying the result of Lemma 1, we know that the
maximum in (73) is achieved when ~v0 and ~v1 are chosen in the
direction of the eigenstates of TρTTρ corresponding to the two
largest eigenvalues. This concludes the proof for the N = 3
case:
Mρ ≤ 2
√
t0 + t1 , (74)
where t0 and t1 are the two largest eigenvalues of TρTTρ .
Tightness conditions: The bound (10) is tight if the corre-
lation matrix Tρ of the considered state satisfies certain con-
ditions, i.e. for certain classes of states. Here we report the
tightness conditions valid in the N = 3 case, while the ones
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for general N and their derivation are given in section III of
the Supplementary Information.
The upper bound (10) on the maximal violation of the tri-
partite MABK inequality by a given state ρ is tight, that is
there exists an honest implementation achieving the bound,
if there exist unit vectors ~a0,~a1,~b0 and ~b1 such that the fol-
lowing identities are satisfied:
~a0 ⊗~b1 + ~a1 ⊗~b0 = 2
√
t0
t0 + t1
~t0
~a0 ⊗~b0 − ~a1 ⊗~b1 = 2
√
t1
t0 + t1
~t1, (75)
where ~t0 and ~t1 are the normalized eigenvectors of TρTTρ cor-
responding to the two largest eigenvalues t0 and t1.
It is interesting to compare the tightness of our bound with
the bound derived in [64]. The major difference is that our
bound can be saturated even when the matrix TρTTρ has no
degenerate eigenvalues, opposed to [64] which requires the de-
generacy of the largest eigenvalue of TρTTρ . When the matrix
TρT
T
ρ is degenerate in its largest eigenvalue (i.e. t0 = t1), we
recover the same tightness conditions of [64]. For this reason,
our bound is tight on a larger set of states compared to the
bound in [64].
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I. EVE’S UNCERTAINTY IS NON-INCREASING UNDER SYMMETRIZATION OF THE OUTCOMES
In proving Theorem 1, we argue that all the marginals are random (39) without loss of generality. This can be enforced
by assuming that Eve flips the classical outcomes of the measurements in specific combinations. Otherwise, Eve could
also provide the parties with a state that inherently leads to the symmetrized marginals, which is the mixture ρ¯ given
in Eq. (42). However, Eve would provide such a state in place of the original (unknown) state ρ only if her uncertainty
on the parties’ outcomes does not increase.
In the paper, we quantify Eve’s uncertainty via the von Neumann entropy of the classical outcomes conditioned on
Eve’s quantum side information E. The specific outcomes that we consider depend on the cryptographic application
that is being addressed. For instance, in the paper we employ Theorem 1 to tightly estimate Eve’s uncertainty on
Alice’s random outcome X by computing H(X|E), when Alice, Bob and Charlie test the MABK inequality. This
result finds potential application in DICKA and DIRG protocols. Indeed, in a DICKA scheme Bob and Charlie would
correct their raw key bits to match Alice’s bits represented by X, while in a DIRG protocol the goal is to ensure that
Alice’s random outcome X is unknown to Eve. Additionally, we employ Theorem 1 to estimate Eve’s uncertainty on
the outcomes of Alice (X) and Bob (Y ) jointly, by computing H(XY |E).
For illustration purposes, here we provide the full proof that Eve’s uncertainty of Alice’s outcomeX is non-increasing
if she distributes the state ρ¯ in place of ρ to N = 3 parties. However, we remark that an analogous proof would hold
for any number of parties and any number of outcomes. Therefore, we must verify that the following condition is met:
H(X|E)ρ ≥ H(X|Etot)ρ¯, (I.1)
where Eve’s quantum system Etot = ETT ′ contains: the quantum side information E, the outcome of the random
variable T indicating to Eve which of the four states in the mixture ρ¯ to distribute, and the purifying system T ′.
Indeed, Eve preparing ρ¯ can be interpreted as she preparing one of the four states:
ρ, (Z ⊗ Z ⊗ id) ρ (Z ⊗ Z ⊗ id), (Z ⊗ id⊗ Z) ρ (Z ⊗ id⊗ Z), (id⊗ Z ⊗ Z) ρ (id⊗ Z ⊗ Z) (I.2)
depending on the outcome t of a random variable stored in the register T . Since Eve holds the purification of every
state in (I.2): {|φtABCE〉}4t=1, the global state prepared by Eve is:
ρ¯ABCET =
1
4
∑
t
|φtABCE〉 〈φtABCE | ⊗ |t〉〈t|T (I.3)
Finally, we assume that Eve holds the purifying system of the global state, thus the state she prepares is:
|φ¯ABCETT ′〉 = 1
2
∑
t
|φtABCE〉 ⊗ |t〉T ⊗ |t〉T ′ , (I.4)
which is a purification of (I.3), where both registers T and T ′ are held by Eve and thus appear in Etot.
In order to prove (I.1), we start by using the strong subadditivity property:
H(X|Etot)ρ¯ ≤ H(X|ET )ρ¯ (I.5)
where the r.h.s. entropy is computed on the following state:
ρ¯XET = (EX ⊗ idET ) TrBC [ρ¯ABCET ]
=
1
4
(EX ⊗ idET ) TrBC
[∑
t
|φtABCE〉 〈φtABCE | ⊗ |t〉〈t|T
]
≡ 1
4
∑
t
ρtXE ⊗ |t〉〈t|T , (I.6)
1 corresponding author: federico.grasselli@hhu.de 2 corresponding author: glaucia.murta@hhu.de
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where the quantum map
EX(σ) =
1∑
a=0
|a〉〈a|〈a|σ |a〉
represents the projective measurement performed by Alice. Being the state in Eq. (I.6) a c.q. state, its entropy
simplifies to:
H(X|ET )ρ¯ = 1
4
∑
t
H(X|E)ρt . (I.7)
The last part of the proof shows that H(X|E)ρt is actually independent of t and equal to conditional entropy of the
original state H(X|E)ρ. This is clear if the state ρtXE is made explicit. From Eq. (I.6) we have that:
ρtXE = (EX ⊗ idET ) TrBC
[|φtABCE〉 〈φtABCE |] , (I.8)
where |φtABCE〉 is the purification of one of the four states in (I.2) prepared by Eve according to the random variable
T . For definiteness, let’s fix that state to be (Z ⊗ Z ⊗ id) ρ (Z ⊗ Z ⊗ id), although an analogous reasoning holds for
any other state in Eq. (I.2). By writing ρ in its spectral decomposition:
ρ =
∑
λ
λ|λ〉〈λ|, (I.9)
we can immediately explicit |φtABCE〉 as follows:
|φtABCE〉 =
∑
λ
√
λ |λt〉ABC ⊗ |eλ〉E , (I.10)
where the eigenstates of the operator (Z ⊗Z ⊗ id) ρ (Z ⊗Z ⊗ id) read: |λt〉 = (Z ⊗Z ⊗ id) |λ〉. By substituting (I.10)
into (I.8) and by expliciting the map EX we obtain the following expression:
ρtXE =
1∑
a=0
|a〉〈a|⊗
∑
λ,σ
√
λσTrBC
[〈a| |λt〉 〈σt| |a〉] |eλ〉〈eσ |
=
1∑
a=0
|a〉〈a|⊗
∑
λ,σ
√
λσTrBC [〈a| (Z ⊗ Z ⊗ id) |λ〉 〈σ| (Z ⊗ Z ⊗ id) |a〉] |eλ〉〈eσ |
=
1∑
a=0
|a〉〈a|⊗
∑
λ,σ
√
λσTrBC [〈a¯| |λ〉 〈σ| |a¯〉] |eλ〉〈eσ |
=
1∑
a=0
|a¯〉〈a¯|⊗
∑
λ,σ
√
λσTrBC [〈a| |λ〉 〈σ| |a〉] |eλ〉〈eσ |
≡
1∑
a=0
|a¯〉〈a¯|⊗ρaE , (I.11)
where in the third equality we used the fact that Alice’s measurement lies in the (x, y)-plane hence the Z operator flips
its outcome (a→ a¯) and the cyclic property of the trace. In the fourth equality we relabelled the classical outcomes:
a↔ a¯. Finally, by comparing (I.11) with the analogous state ρXE obtained from the original state ρ (i.e. in the case
where Eve does not prepare the mixture of states in (I.2)):
ρXE =
1∑
a=0
|a〉〈a|⊗ρaE , (I.12)
we observe that ρtXE and ρXE are the same state up to a permutation of the classical outcomes, thus their conditional
entropies coincide:
H(X|E)ρt = H(X|E)ρ ∀ t. (I.13)
In conclusion, by combining Eqs. (I.13), (I.7) and (I.5), we obtain the claim given in Eq. (I.1). This concludes the
proof.
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II. EQUIVALENCE OF ρ¯+ AND ρ¯−
In the main text we claim that it is not restrictive to assume that Eve distributes the following mixture
ρα =
ρ¯+ + ρ¯−
2
, (II.1)
in place of the state ρ¯+ given in Eq. (52). As argued in section I, for illustration purposes we prove the claim in the
case where three parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, test a (3, 2, 2) full-correlator Bell inequality and are interested in
bounding Eve’s uncertainty about Alice’s outcome X, quantified by the conditional von Neumann entropy H(X|E).
Nevertheless, an analogous proof would hold for any number of parties and joint entropies.
In the first part of the proof, we verify that the states ρ¯+ and ρ¯− are equivalent from the viewpoint of the protocol.
Precisely, the statistics generated by the two states coincides, as well as Eve’s uncertainty about Alice’s outcome,
quantified by the conditional entropy H(X|E). In the second part we show that Eve’s uncertainty does not increase
if she prepares a balanced mixture of the two states (II.1), instead of preparing one of the two states singularly.
We start by computing the statistics generated by the states ρ¯+ and ρ¯− (52), which read as follows for N = 3:
ρ¯± =
1∑
i,j,k=0
λijk |ψi,j,k〉 〈ψi,j,k| ±
1∑
j,k=0
rjk (|ψ0,j,k〉 〈ψ1,j,k|+ h.c.) + is (|ψ0,1,1〉 〈ψ1,1,1| − h.c.) , (II.2)
where h.c. indicates the Hermitian conjugate of the term appearing alongside it. Note that we arbitrarily assumed
three out of four off-diagonal elements to be purely real, according to the prescription characterizing ρ¯+ and ρ¯− (52).
Since we fixed the parties’ measurements to be in the (x, y)-plane, their observables and the relative eigenstates
can be written as follows:
A = cos(ϕA)X + sin(ϕA)Y, |a〉A =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)aeiϕA |1〉)
B = cos(ϕB)X + sin(ϕB)Y, |b〉B =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)beiϕB |1〉)
C = cos(ϕC)X + sin(ϕC)Y, |c〉C =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)ceiϕC |1〉), (II.3)
where X,Y and Z are the Pauli operators, A, B and C are the observables of Alice, Bob and Charlie, respectively,
and the measurement outcomes are defined to be a, b, c ∈ {0, 1} (where a = 0 corresponds to eigenvalue +1 and a = 1
to eigenvalue -1). Then, the statistics generated by the states ρ¯+ and ρ¯− reads:
Pr[A = a,B = b, C = c]ρ¯± =
1∑
i,j,k=0
λijk 〈ψi,j,k| |a, b, c〉〈a, b, c||ψi,j,k〉
± 2
1∑
j,k=0
rjkRe[〈ψ0,j,k| |a, b, c〉〈a, b, c||ψ1,j,k〉]
− 2 s Im[〈ψ1,1,1| |a, b, c〉〈a, b, c||ψ0,1,1〉]. (II.4)
Therefore, the two statistics coincide if and only if the coefficients of the terms rjk are all identically null:
Re[〈ψ0,j,k| |a, b, c〉〈a, b, c||ψ1,j,k〉] = 0 ∀ j, k, a, b, c. (II.5)
A straightforward calculation of the coefficients of rjk, by using the expressions in Eqs. (II.3) and (3), leads to the
following result:
〈ψ0,j,k| |a, b, c〉〈a, b, c||ψ1,j,k〉 = i 2(−1)
a+b+cIm[eiϕAeiϕB(−1)
j
eiϕC(−1)
k
]
16
, (II.6)
which is indeed purely imaginary. This proves the condition (II.5) and thus that the statistics of ρ¯+ and ρ¯− are
identical.
The next step of the proof consists in showing that Eve’s uncertainty about Alice’s outcome is unchanged if she
distributes ρ¯+ or ρ¯−, i.e. the following condition must be verified:
H(X|E)ρ¯+ = H(X|E)ρ¯− . (II.7)
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In order to show (II.7), we compute the conditional entropy produced by each state as follows:
H(X|E) = H(E|X) +H(X)−H(E) (II.8)
and verify that each term in (II.8) is identical for the two states ρ¯+ and ρ¯−. To begin with, we know that the Shannon
entropy H(X) is given by:
H(X) = h(Pr[A = 0]), (II.9)
where h(·) is the binary entropy, defined as: h(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p). Since we proved that the statistics
generated by ρ¯+ and ρ¯− are the same, it follows that:
H(X)ρ¯+ = H(X)ρ¯− . (II.10)
In order to compute the other two terms in (II.8), we write ρ¯+ and ρ¯− in their spectral decomposition:
ρ¯±
1∑
i,j,k=0
ρijk|ρ±ijk〉〈ρ±ijk |, (II.11)
where ρijk are the states’ eigenvalues, which one can easily verify to be identical for the two states, while |ρ±ijk〉 are
the normalized eigenvectors, expressed for simplicity in terms of the following non-normalized eigenvectors:
|ρ˜±ijk〉 =
λ0jk − λ1jk − (−1)i
√
4r2jk + (λ0jk − λ1jk)2
±2rjk |ψ0,j,k〉+ |ψ1,j,k〉
≡ ±f ijk |ψ0,j,k〉+ |ψ1,j,k〉 (j, k) 6= (1, 1) (II.12)
|ρ˜±i11〉 = (±r11 + is)
λ011 − λ111 − (−1)i
√
4r211 + 4s
2 + (λ011 − λ111)2
2(r211 + s
2)
|ψ0,1,1〉+ |ψ1,1,1〉
≡ (±gi11 + ihi11) |ψ0,1,1〉+ |ψ1,1,1〉 . (II.13)
Since ρ¯+ and ρ¯− have the same eigenvalues, it holds that:
H(ABC)ρ¯+ = H(ABC)ρ¯− . (II.14)
Assuming that Eve holds the purification
|φ¯±ABCE〉 =
1∑
i,j,k=0
√
ρijk |ρ±ijk〉 ⊗ |eijk〉 (II.15)
of the parties’ state, where {|eijk〉} is an orthonormal basis in E, it follows that:
H(E)ρ¯+ = H(E)ρ¯− . (II.16)
The remaining term in (II.8) is H(E|X), which is computed on the c.q. state:
ρ¯±XE =
1∑
a=0
|a〉〈a|⊗
1∑
i,j,k=0
l,m,n=0
√
ρijkρlmn TrBC
[
〈a| |ρ±ijk〉 〈ρ±lmn| |a〉
]
|eijk〉〈elmn |
≡
1∑
a=0
Pr[A = a]|a〉〈a|⊗ρa,±E , (II.17)
where ρa,±E is the conditional state of Eve, given that Alice obtained outcome a. By employing the expressions in
Eqs. (II.12) and (II.13), one can verify that the operators ρa,±E are one the transpose of the other: ρ
a,+
E = (ρ
a,−
E )
T .
Thus ρa,+E and ρ
a,−
E have the same eigenvalues, which implies that:
H(ρa,+E ) = H(ρ
a,−
E ) (II.18)
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Finally, since the conditional entropy H(E|X) is computed as follows on the classical quantum states in (II.17):
H(E|X)ρ¯± =
1∑
a=0
Pr[A = a]H(ρa,±E ), (II.19)
we conclude that:
H(E|X)ρ¯+ = H(E|X)ρ¯− . (II.20)
By combining the results in Eqs. (II.10), (II.16) and (II.20) into (II.7), we verified that the states ρ¯+ and ρ¯− lead to
the same conditional entropy.
The final part of the proof shows that Eve’s uncertainty in preparing the mixture ρα (II.1) does not increase with
respect to preparing one of the two states ρ¯±:
H(X|Etot)ρα ≤ H(X|E)ρ¯+ . (II.21)
In this way we can guarantee that it is not restrictive to assume that Eve prepares the mixture (II.1). In giving Eve
maximum power, we assume that she prepares the following global pure state (similarly to section I):
|φABCEMM ′〉 1√
2
∑
m=+,−
|φ¯mABCE〉 ⊗ |m〉M ⊗ |m〉M ′ , (II.22)
where |φ¯±ABCE〉 are the purifications of the individual states ρ¯± defined in (II.15), while M is an ancillary system
informing Eve on which of the two purified states she prepared and M ′ is the purifying system of the global state.
Therefore, Eve has maximum power and her quantum system comprises: Etot = EMM ′. Naturally, it holds that:
ρα = TrEtot [|φABCEMM ′〉〈φABCEMM ′ |] . (II.23)
For the strong subadditivity property, we have that:
H(X|Etot)ρα = H(X|EMM ′)ρα ≤ H(X|EM)ρα =
1
2
∑
m=+,−
H(X|E)ρ¯m , (II.24)
where the last equality is due to the fact that the state TrM ′ [|φABCEMM ′〉 〈φABCEMM ′ |] is classical onM . Finally, by
employing the result (II.7) into (II.24), we obtain the claim in (II.21). This concludes the proof. The same argument
can be used to generalized the proof for the case of N parties and for the conditional entropy of the joint outcome of
more than one party.
III. MAXIMAL MABK VIOLATION BY AN N-QUBIT STATE: PROOF
Here we provide the full proof of Theorem 2 and of Lemma 1, which combined provide an analytical upper bound on
the maximal violation of the N -partite MABK inequality by an arbitrary N -qubit state. This is, to our knowledge,
the only existing upper bound on the violation of the N -partite MABK inequality by an N -qubit state, expressed
as a function of the state’s parameters. In Ref. [64] the authors conjectured a bound for the N -party case based on
their result valid for three parties. Analogously to the three-party case (see the Methods section in the main text),
our N -partite bound is tighter than the bound conjectured in Ref. [64].
We start by proving Lemma 1, which plays an important role in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. Let Q be an m×n real matrix and let ‖~v‖ be the Euclidean norm of vectors ~v ∈ Rk, for k = m,n. Finally,
let “·” indicate both the scalar product and the matrix-vector multiplication. Then
max
~c⊥~c ′ s.t.
‖~c‖=‖~c ′‖=1
[
‖Q · ~c‖2 + ‖Q · ~c ′‖2
]
= u1 + u2 , (III.1)
where u1 and u2 are the largest and second-to-the-largest eigenvalues of U ≡ QTQ, respectively.
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Proof. Note that U is a symmetric n × n real matrix, thus it can be diagonalized. The eigenvalue equation for U
reads:
U · ~ui = ui ~ui i = 1, . . . , n , (III.2)
where the set of eigenvectors forms an orthonormal basis of Rn: ~uTi ·~uj = δi,j and without loss of generality we ordered
the eigenvalues as: u1 ≥ u2 ≥ . . . ≥ un ≥ 0. Note that every eigenvalue is non-negative:
ui = ~u
T
i · U · ~ui = ~uTi ·QTQ · ~ui = ‖Q · ~ui‖2 ≥ 0 .
By considering that: ‖Q · ~c‖2 = ~c T ·QTQ ·~c = ~c T ·U ·~c and by expressing the vectors ~c and ~c ′ in the eigenbasis of U :
~c =
n∑
i=1
ci~ui
~c ′ =
n∑
i=1
c′i~ui ,
we can recast the claim in (60) as follows:
max
~c⊥~c ′ s.t.
‖~c‖=‖~c ′‖=1
n∑
i=1
ui(c
2
i + c
′
i
2
) = u1 + u2 . (III.3)
Let us consider the most general scenario in which some of the eigenvalues of U are degenerate: u1 ≥ u2 = u3 = · · · =
ud > ud+1 ≥ . . . un ≥ 0, where d = 2, . . . , n. Note that we also account for the possibility that u1 = u2.
We are now going to prove (III.3) by showing that for any couple of mutually-orthogonal unit vectors ~c and ~c ′ the
left-hand-side of (III.3) is upper bounded by u1 + u2 and that the bound is tight.
We start by considering two unit vectors in Rn:{
~c T = (c1, . . . , cn) s.t. ‖~c‖2 = 1
~c ′T = (c′1, . . . , c
′
n) s.t. ‖~c ′‖2 = 1 ,
(III.4)
and we define two unit vectors ~v, ~w ∈ Rd−1 along the directions individuated by (c2, . . . , cd) and (c′2, . . . , c′d), i.e.:
cv~v
T ≡ (c2, . . . , cd)
c′w ~w
T ≡ (c′2, . . . , c′d) , (III.5)
where cv and c′w are the norms of (c2, . . . , cd) and (c′2, . . . , c′d), respectively. For d = 2 we simply have that cv~v
T = c2
and c′w ~w T = c′2.
With an abuse of notation, we can rewrite (III.4) as:{
~c T = (c1, cv~v
T , cd+1, . . . , cn) s.t. c21 + c2v + r = 1
~c ′T = (c′1, c
′
w ~w
T , c′d+1, . . . , c
′
n) s.t. c′1
2
+ c′w
2
+ r′ = 1 ,
(III.6)
where r ≡∑ni=d+1 c2i and r′ ≡∑ni=d+1 c′i2 and for both holds that: 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ r′ ≤ 1. From the orthogonality
condition ~c T · ~c ′ = 0 we get that:
|c1c′1| =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=2
cic
′
i
∣∣∣∣∣ , (III.7)
and from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we deduce that:∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=2
cic
′
i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
(c2v + r)(c
′
w
2 + r′) . (III.8)
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By employing (III.7), (III.8) and the normalization conditions in (III.6), we show that c21 + c′1
2 ≤ 1 holds:(
c21 + c
′
1
2
)2
= c41 + c
′
1
4
+ 2c21c
′
1
2
≤ c41 + c′14 + 2
(
1− c21
) (
1− c′12
)
= 2− 2
(
c21 + c
′
1
2
)
+
(
c21 + c
′
1
2
)2
. (III.9)
By comparing the left-hand-side with the right-hand-side one gets the desired result:
c21 + c
′
1
2 ≤ 1 . (III.10)
We now prove the claim in (III.3) through the following chain of equalities and inequalities:
n∑
i=1
ui(c
2
i + c
′
i
2
) = u1(c
2
1 + c
′
1
2
) + u2(c
2
v + c
′
w
2
) +
n∑
i=d+1
ui(c
2
i + c
′
i
2
)
≤ u1(c21 + c′12) + u2(1− r − c21 + 1− r′ − c′12) + ud+1(r + r′)
= u2 + (u1 − u2)(c21 + c′12) + u2 − (r + r′)(u2 − ud+1)
≤ u1 + u2 , (III.11)
where we used the normalization conditions and the fact that the eigenvalues are ordered in descending order for the
first inequality, and we used (III.10) together with the fact that r, r′ ≥ 0 for the second inequality.
We are left to show that (III.11) is tight, that is there exist unit vectors ~c and ~c ′ for which the equality sign holds.
If u1 = u2, the upper bound is attained when r = r′ = 0. Thus the most general pair of vectors satisfying (III.3) is
given by: {
~c T = (~V T , 0, . . . , 0)
~c ′T = ( ~W T , 0, . . . , 0)
, ~V , ~W ∈ Rd s.t.
∥∥∥~V ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥ ~W∥∥∥ = 1 ∧ (~V , ~W ) = 0 . (III.12)
If instead u1 > u2, the upper bound is attained when r = r′ = 0 and c21 + c′1
2
= 1. The second condition is verified
when the equality holds in (III.8), which in turn happens when the unit vectors ~v and ~w are parallel. Thus the most
general pair of vectors satisfying (III.3) is given by:{
~c T = (c1, cv~v
T , 0, . . . , 0)
~c ′T = (c′1, c
′
w~v
T , 0, . . . , 0)
, ~v ∈ Rd−1 ∧ c21 + c′12 = 1 , (III.13)
and where the orthogonality and normalization conditions hold: c1c′1 + cvc′w = 0, c21 + c2v = 1 and c′1
2
+ c′w
2
= 1. Such
solutions can always be parametrized as follows:{
~c T = (cosα, sinα~v T , 0, . . . , 0)
~c ′T = (− sinα, cosα~v T , 0, . . . , 0) , α ∈ R . (III.14)
This concludes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. The maximum violation Mρ of the N -partite MABK inequality (9), attained by an N -qubit state ρ,
satisfies
Mρ ≤ 2
√
t0 + t1 (III.15)
where t0 and t1 are the largest and second-to-the-largest eigenvalues of the matrix TρTTρ , where Tρ is the correlation
matrix of ρ.
Proof. Firstly, we present closed expressions for the N -partite MABK operator, defined recursively in Definition 2. In
particular, in Ref. [68] the explicit expression of the N -partite MABK operator when N is odd is given:
ModdN =
1
2
N−3
2
∑
x∈LN
(−1) 12 (N−12 −ω(x))
N⊗
i=1
P ixi , (III.16)
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where P i0 and P i1 are the two binary observables of party number i, x = (x1, . . . , xN ) is a bit string with Hamming
weight given by:
ω(x) = |{1 ≤ i ≤ N |xi = 1}|, (III.17)
and the set LN is defined as follows:
LN =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}N
∣∣∣ω(x) = N − 1
2
mod 2
}
. (III.18)
By applying once the MABK recursive formula (7) on (III.16), one obtains an explicit expression of the N -partite
MABK operator for N even. We distinguish the case N/2 even:
N
2
even: M evenN =
1
2
N−2
2
∑
x∈{0,1}N
(−1)N4 −dω(x)2 e
N⊗
i=1
P ixi , (III.19)
and the case N/2 odd:
N
2
odd: M evenN =
1
2
N−2
2
∑
x∈{0,1}N
(−1)N−24 −bω(x)2 c
N⊗
i=1
P ixi , (III.20)
where dae and bac are the ceiling and floor functions, respectively.
We now derive an explicit expression of the MABK expectation value for a generic N -qubit state. As shown above,
the N -party MABK operator can be written in explicit form as follows:
MN =
1
NN
∑
x∈SN
(−1)ξN (x)
N⊗
i=1
P ixi , (III.21)
where the normalization factor NN , the set of N -bit strings SN and the exponent ξN (x) depend on the parity of N
(e.g. SN = {0, 1}N for N even and SN = LN for N odd). By restricting to projective measurements, every observable
P ixi can be individuated by a unit vector
~pixi ∈ R3 such that:
P ixi =
~pixi · ~σ =
3∑
νi=1
pixi,νiσνi , (III.22)
where ~σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3)T . By substituting (III.22) into (III.21) are by rearranging the terms we get:
MN =
1
NN
3∑
ν1,...,νN=1
[ ∑
x∈SN
(−1)ξN (x)
N∏
i=1
pixi,νi
]
σν1 ⊗ . . .⊗ σνN
≡ 1NN
3∑
ν1,...,νN=1
Mν1,...,νNσν1 ⊗ . . .⊗ σνN . (III.23)
We now employ (III.23) and the expression for a generic N -qubit state:
ρ =
1
2N
3∑
µ1...µN=0
Λµ1...µNσµ1 ⊗ . . .⊗ σµN , (III.24)
to derive an explicit expression for the MABK expectation value as follows:
〈MN 〉ρ = Tr[MNρ] =
1
NN
3∑
ν1,...,νN=1
Mν1,...,νNΛν1...νN
=
1
NN
3∑
ν1,...,νN=1
[ ∑
x∈SN
(−1)ξN (x) p1x1,ν1 · . . . · pNxN ,νN Λν1...νN
]
, (III.25)
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where we used the fact that Tr[σiσj ] = 2δi,j .
We now specify the expressions for NN ,SN and ξN (x) when N/2 is even and prove the theorem’s statement in this
particular case. However, a similar procedure applies to the N/2 odd and N odd cases and leads to the same final
result.
We thus have the following expression for the MABK expectation value:
〈MN 〉ρ =
1
2
N−2
2
3∑
ν1,...,νN=1
 ∑
x∈{0,1}N
(−1)N4 −dω(x)2 e p1x1,ν1 · . . . · pNxN ,νN Λν1...νN
 , (III.26)
and we rearrange it as follows:
〈MN 〉ρ =
1
2
N−2
2
3∑
ν1,...,νN=1
 ∑
x∈{0,1}N/2
∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)N4 −dω(x)+ω(y)2 e
p1x1,ν1 · . . . · pN/2xN/2,νN/2 Λν1...νN pN/2y1,νN/2 · . . . · pNyN/2,νN
]
=
1
2
N−2
2
3∑
ν1,...,νN=1
 ∑
x∈EN/2
∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)N4 −dω(x)+ω(y)2 e
p1x1,ν1 · . . . · pN/2xN/2,νN/2 Λν1...νN pN/2y1,νN/2 · . . . · pNyN/2,νN
+
∑
x∈ON/2
∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)N4 −dω(x)+ω(y)2 e
p1x1,ν1 · . . . · pN/2xN/2,νN/2 Λν1...νN pN/2y1,νN/2 · . . . · pNyN/2,νN
]
, (III.27)
where the sets EN/2 and ON/2 are defined as follows:
EN/2 =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}N/2|ω(x) mod 2 = 0
}
(III.28)
ON/2 =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}N/2|ω(x) mod 2 = 1
}
. (III.29)
We basically split the bit strings x into those with an even Hamming weight and those with an odd Hamming weight.
Now considering that the following identity holds:⌈
ω(x) + ω(y)
2
⌉
=
{
ω(x) even: bω(x)2 c+ bω(y)2 c+ (ω(y) mod 2)
ω(x) odd: bω(x)2 c+ bω(y)2 c+ 1,
(III.30)
we can recast the MABK expectation value in (III.27) as follows:
〈MN 〉ρ =
1
2
N−2
2
3∑
ν1,...,νN=1
 ∑
x∈EN/2
(−1)N4 −bω(x)2 c p1x1,ν1 · . . . · pN/2xN/2,νN/2

Λν1...νN
 ∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)bω(y)2 c+(ω(y) mod 2) pN/2y1,νN/2 · . . . · pNyN/2,νN

+
 ∑
x∈ON/2
(−1)N4 −bω(x)2 c p1x1,ν1 · . . . · pN/2xN/2,νN/2

Λν1...νN
 ∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)bω(y)2 c+1 pN/2y1,νN/2 · . . . · pNyN/2,νN

≡ 1
2
N−2
2
[
~vT0 · Tρ · ~u0 + ~vT1 · Tρ · ~u1
]
. (III.31)
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In the expression (III.31) we defined the vectors:
~v0 =
∑
x∈EN/2
(−1)N4 −bω(x)2 c
N/2⊗
i=1
~pixi , (III.32)
~v1 =
∑
x∈ON/2
(−1)N4 −bω(x)2 c
N/2⊗
i=1
~pixi , (III.33)
~u0 =
∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)bω(y)2 c+(ω(y) mod 2)
N/2⊗
i=1
~
p
N/2+i
yi , (III.34)
~u1 =
∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)bω(y)2 c+1
N/2⊗
i=1
~
p
N/2+i
yi , (III.35)
and we used Definition 3 of the correlation matrix of an N -qubit state. The 3N/2-dimensional vectors in
(III.32),(III.33),(III.34) and (III.35) are heavily constrained by their tensor-product structure and satisfy the fol-
lowing properties:
Prop. 1: ‖~v0‖2 + ‖~v1‖2 = 2N/2 (III.36)
Prop. 2: ‖~u0‖2 = ‖~u1‖2 = 2N/2 (III.37)
Prop. 3: ~v0 · ~v1 = 0. (III.38)
These properties play a fundamental role in deriving a meaningful upper bound on the MABK expectation value.
We prove the first property (III.36) by directly computing the l.h.s.:
‖~v0‖2 + ‖~v1‖2 = ~v0 · ~v0 + ~v1 · ~v1
=
∑
x,y∈EN/2
(−1)N2 −bω(x)2 c−bω(y)2 c
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
xi⊕yi
+
∑
x,y∈ON/2
(−1)N2 −bω(x)2 c−bω(y)2 c
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
xi⊕yi , (III.39)
where we used the fact that ~pixi are unit vectors and we called θi the angle between the two measurement directions of
party number i: cos θi = ~pi0 · ~pi1. Note that the symbol ⊕ is the binary operation XOR. We now define the bit string:
r = x⊕ y, whose Hamming weight can be computed as:
ω(r) = ω(x⊕ y) = ω(x) + ω(y)− 2ω(x ∧ y), (III.40)
where ∧ is the binary operation AND. From (III.40) it follows immediately that the Hamming weight of the string
r is always even, since the Hamming weights of x and y are either both even or both odd in (III.39). With this
information, we can recast (III.39) as follows:
‖~v0‖2 + ‖~v1‖2 =
∑
r∈EN/2
 ∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)bω(r⊕y)2 c+bω(y)2 c +
∑
y∈ON/2
(−1)bω(r⊕y)2 c+bω(y)2 c
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
ri , (III.41)
where we used the fact that N/2 is even and where the string x is completely fixed once r and y are fixed: x = r⊕y.
Now we employ the relation (III.40) in (III.41) and we make use of the information on the parity of the Hamming
weights appearing in the two sums:
‖~v0‖2 + ‖~v1‖2 =
∑
r∈EN/2
 ∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r)2 +ω(y)−ω(r∧y) +
∑
y∈ON/2
(−1)ω(r)+ω(y)−2ω(r∧y)−12 +ω(y)−12

×
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
ri . (III.42)
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Note that ba/2c = (a−1)/2 if a is an odd number. The expression in (III.42) can be further simplified by considering
that even addends in the exponents of (−1) can be ignored:
‖~v0‖2 + ‖~v1‖2 =
∑
r∈EN/2
 ∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r)2 −ω(r∧y) +
∑
y∈ON/2
(−1)ω(r)2 −ω(r∧y)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
ri
=
∑
r∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r)2
 ∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)ω(r∧y)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
ri
= 2N/2 +
∑
r∈EN/2
r6=0
(−1)ω(r)2
 ∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)ω(r∧y)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
ri , (III.43)
where we extracted the term r = 0 from the sum in the last equality.
The last step to prove the first property (III.36) is to show that every term in the remaining sum in (III.43) is
identically zero, i.e. we want to show that: ∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)ω(r∧y) = 0 ∀ r 6= 0. (III.44)
In order for (III.44) to be verified, there must be as many (−1) terms as +1 terms, and since there are in total 2N/2
terms, there must be exactly 2N/2−1 terms (half of the total) that are (−1). We can count the number of (−1) terms
in (III.44) as follows: ∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(ω(r ∧ y) mod 2), (III.45)
and check whether it equals 2N/2−1, as claimed. Note that ω(r ∧ y) represents the number of ones in r that are also
in y. The parity of this number is then summed over all the possible bit strings y of length N/2. We can thus recast
the sum, as a sum over the number of ones that r and y have in common (k), times the number of bit strings y that
share k ones with r:
∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(ω(r ∧ y) mod 2) =
ω(r)∑
k=0
(k mod 2)
(
ω(r)
k
)
2N/2−ω(r). (III.46)
Note that the number of bit strings y that have k ones in common with a fixed string r, is given by the number of
possible combinations of k ones from the total number of ones (ω(r)) populating the string r, times the number of
possibilities (2N/2−ω(r)) that we have to fill the remaining bits of y that are not part of the k ones in common with r.
We can now adjust the r.h.s. of (III.46) to the following computable form:
2N/2−ω(r)
ω(r)∑
k=0
k odd
(
ω(r)
k
)
= 2N/2−ω(r) 2ω(r)−1
= 2N/2−1, (III.47)
where the first equality is obtained by combining two known facts about the binomial coefficient, namely:
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
= 2n (III.48)
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
n
k
)
= 0. (III.49)
Indeed, by subtracting (III.49) from (III.48) one gets that:∑
k odd
(
n
k
)
= 2n−1, (III.50)
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which is used in the first equality in (III.47).
Combining (III.46) and (III.47) we conclude that (III.44) is verified. We have thus shown the validity of the first
property (III.36).
We move on to prove the second property (III.37). We start from (III.34) and use the fact that bω(x)2 c + (ω(x)
mod 2) = (ω(x) + [ω(x) mod 2)]/2) :
‖~u0‖2 =
∑
x,y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)ω(x)+(ω(x) mod 2)2 +ω(y)+(ω(y) mod 2)2
N/2∏
i=1
(cos(θN/2+i))
xi⊕yi
=
∑
r∈{0,1}N/2
 ∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)ω(r)+ω(y)−2ω(r∧y)+(ω(r)+ω(y) mod 2)2 +ω(y)+(ω(y) mod 2)2

×
N/2∏
i=1
(cos(θN/2+i))
ri , (III.51)
where we defined r = x ⊕ y and we used the relation (III.40). We proceed to simplify (III.51) by splitting the sum
over y over the strings with even and odd Hamming weight:
‖~u0‖2 =
∑
r∈{0,1}N/2
 ∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r)+(ω(r) mod 2)2 −ω(r∧y)
+
∑
y∈ON/2
(−1)ω(r)+1+(ω(r)+1 mod 2)2 −ω(r∧y)+ω(y)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos(θN/2+i))
ri . (III.52)
By employing the following identities:
ω(r) + (ω(r) mod 2)
2
=
⌈
ω(r)
2
⌉
(III.53)
(−1)a = (−1)1 a odd (III.54)
ω(r) + 1 + (ω(r) + 1 mod 2)
2
=
⌈
ω(r) + 1
2
⌉
=
⌈
ω(r)
2
⌉
+ 1− (ω(r) mod 2) (III.55)
into (III.52) we obtain:
‖~u0‖2 =
∑
r∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)dω(r)2 e
 ∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r∧y)
+
∑
y∈ON/2
(−1)ω(r∧y)+(ω(r) mod 2)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos(θN/2+i))
ri
= 2N/2 +
∑
r∈{0,1}N/2
r 6=0
(−1)dω(r)2 e
 ∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r∧y)
+
∑
y∈ON/2
(−1)ω(r∧y)+(ω(r) mod 2)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos(θN/2+i))
ri
= 2N/2 +
∑
r∈EN/2
r 6=0
(−1)dω(r)2 e
 ∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)ω(r∧y)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos(θN/2+i))
ri
+
∑
r∈ON/2
(−1)dω(r)2 e
 ∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r∧y) −
∑
y∈ON/2
(−1)ω(r∧y)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos(θN/2+i))
ri , (III.56)
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where we isolated the r = 0 term in the second equality and we split the sum over r in two sums over the strings with
even and odd Hamming weights in the third equality.
The first sum in (III.56) is zero thanks to (III.44). From (III.44) we also deduce that:∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r∧y) +
∑
y∈ON/2
(−1)ω(r∧y) = 0, (III.57)
which means that the term in square brackets in the second sum can be reduced to:
2
∑
y∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r∧y) = 0. (III.58)
The proof that (III.58) holds is analogous to that of (III.44). In particular, (III.58) is verified if the number of (−1)
terms is exactly half the total number of terms, that is 2N/2−2. We show that this is true by computing the number
of (−1) terms as follows:
∑
y∈EN/2
(ω(r ∧ y) mod 2) =
ω(r)∑
k=0
(k mod 2)
(
ω(r)
k
)
2N/2−ω(r)−1
= 2N/2−ω(r)−1
ω(r)∑
k=0
k odd
(
ω(r)
k
)
. (III.59)
Note that this time, compared to (III.46), the number of possibilities (2N/2−ω(r)−1) to fill the non-fixed bits of y is
halved. The reason is that in this case y is constrained to have an even number of ones, thus after fixing N/2− 1 of
its bits, no degree of freedom is left.
By employing again the result on binomial distributions (III.50) in (III.59), we obtain:∑
y∈EN/2
(ω(r ∧ y) mod 2) = 2N/2−2, (III.60)
which proves (III.58).
We have thus shown that both the sums in (III.56) are zero, thus proving the second property (III.37) for ~u0. The
proof of (III.37) for ~u1 is analogous and we omit it.
Finally we show that the third property (III.38) is satisfied by direct computation:
~v0 · ~v1 =
∑
x∈EN/2
y∈ON/2
(−1)bω(x)2 c+bω(y)2 c
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
xi⊕yi
=
∑
x∈EN/2
y∈ON/2
(−1)ω(x)2 +ω(y)−12
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
xi⊕yi
=
∑
r∈ON/2
 ∑
x∈EN/2
(−1)ω(x)−1+ω(x)+ω(r)−2ω(r∧x)2
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
ri
=
∑
r∈ON/2
(−1)ω(r)−12
 ∑
x∈EN/2
(−1)ω(r∧x)
N/2∏
i=1
(cos θi)
ri
= 0, (III.61)
where we defined r = x⊕ y and used (III.40) in the third equality, and used (III.58) in the last equality.
Thanks to the properties (III.36), (III.37) and (III.38), we can express the vectors ~vk and ~uk (k = 0, 1) as follows:
~v0 = 2
N/4 cos θ vˆ0 (III.62)
~v1 = 2
N/4 sin θ vˆ1 (III.63)
~uk = 2
N/4 uˆk (III.64)
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where vˆk and uˆk are unit vectors in the directions of ~vk and ~uk, respectively, and where θ is a real number. With the
expressions (III.62), (III.63) and (III.64) we recast the MABK expectation value (III.31) as follows:
〈MN 〉ρ =
2N/2
2
N−2
2
[
cos θ vˆT0 · Tρ · uˆ0 + sin θ vˆT1 · Tρ · uˆ1
]
= 2
[
cos θ vˆT0 · Tρ · uˆ0 + sin θ vˆT1 · Tρ · uˆ1
]
. (III.65)
The maximal violation Mρ of the N -partite MABK inequality is then obtained by maximizing (III.65) over all the
parties’ measurements directions ~pi0 and
~pi1 (for i = 1, . . . , N). A valid upper bound on the maximal violationMρ is
thus given by:
Mρ ≤ max
vˆk,uˆk,θ
vˆ0⊥vˆ1
2
[
cos θ vˆT0 · Tρ · uˆ0 + sin θ vˆT1 · Tρ · uˆ1
]
, (III.66)
where the inequality is due to the fact that we are now optimizing the expectation value over all the possible unit
vectors vˆk (such that vˆ0 · vˆ1 = 0) and uˆk, and freely over θ, ignoring the more stringent structures (III.32)-(III.35)
characterizing these vectors and their relation to θ. By choosing uˆ0 and uˆ1 in the direction of vˆT0 · Tρ and vˆT1 · Tρ,
respectively, and by fixing θ such that:
tan θ =
∥∥TTρ · vˆ1∥∥∥∥TTρ · vˆ0∥∥ , (III.67)
we can simplify the maximization in (III.66) as follows:
Mρ ≤ max
vˆk,uˆk,θ
vˆ0⊥vˆ1
2
[
cos θ vˆT0 · Tρ · uˆ0 + sin θ vˆT1 · Tρ · uˆ1
]
= max
vˆk,θ
vˆ0⊥vˆ1
2
[
cos θ
∥∥TTρ · vˆ0∥∥+ sin θ ∥∥TTρ · vˆ1∥∥]
= max
vˆk
vˆ0⊥vˆ1
2
√∥∥TTρ · vˆ0∥∥2 + ∥∥TTρ · vˆ1∥∥2. (III.68)
Finally, by employing the result of Lemma 1 in (III.68), we obtain the statement of the theorem:
Mρ ≤
√
t0 + t1, (III.69)
where t0 and t1 are the two largest eigenvalues of TρTTρ . This concludes the proof.
Tightness conditions: Here we derive the conditions for which the upper bound on the MABK violation given in
(10) is tight. That is, there exist observables for the N parties such that the violation achieved on the state ρ is
exactly given by the r.h.s. of (10). We first address the case N/2 even since it is the one explicitly derived in the
proof, then we present the tightness conditions valid in the other cases.
The bound is tight when equality holds in (III.66). Considering that we made specific choices for the unit vectors
vˆi and uˆi and for θ, the vectors in (III.32)-(III.35) should comply with these specific choices. In particular, consider
the eigenvalue equation for TρTTρ with normalized eigenvectors and where t0 and t1 are the two largest eigenvalues:
TρT
T
ρ tˆk = tk tˆk. (III.70)
In order to use Lemma 1 in (III.68), it must hold that:
vˆk =
~vk
‖~vk‖ = tˆk k = 0, 1, (III.71)
where ~vk (k = 0, 1) are defined in (III.32) and (III.33). Employing (III.71) into the relation (III.67) that fixes θ we
get:
‖~v1‖
‖~v0‖ = tan θ =
∥∥TTρ · tˆ1∥∥∥∥TTρ · tˆ0∥∥ =
√
t1
t0
, (III.72)
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where the last equality is due to (III.70). Combining (III.72) with property (III.36) we completely fix the norms
of vectors ~v0 and ~v1, while their direction is already fixed by (III.71). In conclusion we get the following tightness
conditions for ~v0 and ~v1, which we recall being specific combinations (III.32) and (III.33) of the parties’ measurement
directions:
~vk = 2
N/4
√
tk
t0 + t1
tˆk k = 0, 1. (III.73)
In addition to this, we also fixed the directions uˆ0 and uˆ1 to those of TTρ · vˆ0 and TTρ · vˆ1, respectively. Due to
(III.71) and recalling property (III.37), we derive the following tightness conditions on ~u0 and ~u1:
~uk =
2N/4√
tk
TTρ tˆk k = 0, 1. (III.74)
One can verify that upon substituting the tightness conditions (III.73) and (III.74) into the MABK expectation value
(III.31), the theorem claim is obtained.
Here we recapitulate the tightness conditions of theorem 2 for the two cases N even and N odd. The bound in (10)
is tight if there exist unit vectors ~pi0,
~pi1 (with i = 1, . . . , N) such that:
• N even:
~vk = 2
N/4
√
tk
t0 + t1
tˆk , ~uk =
2N/4√
tk
TTρ tˆk k = 0, 1, (III.75)
where vectors ~vk and ~uk are defined in (III.32)-(III.35) if N/2 is even, or as follows if N/2 is odd:
~v0 =
∑
x∈EN/2
(−1)N−24 −bω(x)2 c
N/2⊗
i=1
~pixi , (III.76)
~v1 =
∑
x∈ON/2
(−1)N−24 −bω(x)2 c
N/2⊗
i=1
~pixi , (III.77)
~u0 =
∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)bω(y)2 c
N/2⊗
i=1
~
p
N/2+i
yi , (III.78)
~u1 =
∑
y∈{0,1}N/2
(−1)dω(y)2 e
N/2⊗
i=1
~
p
N/2+i
yi , (III.79)
where the sets EN/2 and ON/2 are defined in (III.28) and (III.29), respectively.
• N odd :
~vk = 2
(N+1)/4
√
tk
t0 + t1
tˆk , ~uk =
2(N−3)/4√
tk
TTρ tˆk k = 0, 1, (III.80)
where vectors ~vk and ~uk are defined as follows:
~v0 =
∑
x∈E(N+1)/2
(−1)bN−14 c−bω(x)2 c
(N+1)/2⊗
i=1
~pixi , (III.81)
~v1 =
∑
x∈O(N+1)/2
(−1)bN−14 c−bω(x)2 c
(N+1)/2⊗
i=1
~pixi , (III.82)
~u0 =
∑
y∈J(N−1)/2
(−1)bω(y)2 c
(N−1)/2⊗
i=1
~
p
(N+1)/2+i
yi , (III.83)
~u1 =
∑
y∈J (N−1)/2
(−1)dω(y)2 e
(N−1)/2⊗
i=1
~
p
(N+1)/2+i
yi , (III.84)
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with the sets J(N−1)/2 and J (N−1)/2 fixed as:
J(N−1)/2 =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}(N−1)/2
∣∣∣ω(x) = N − 1
2
mod 2
}
(III.85)
J (N−1)/2 =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}(N−1)/2
∣∣∣ω(x) + 1 = N − 1
2
mod 2
}
. (III.86)
IV. ANALYTICAL PROOF OF THE LOWER BOUND ON H(X|E)ρα
We want to derive an analytical lower bound on H(X|E)ρα , given by:
H(X|E)ρα = 1−H({ρijk}) +H({ρijk + ρij¯k¯}), (IV.1)
for an observed MABK violation mα. For ease of notation, in the following we drop the subscript α in the observed
violation.
In the Methods section we provide an upper bound on the maximal MABK violation achieved on ρα, given by:
Mα ≤M↑α = 4
√√√√ 1∑
j,k=0
(ρ0jk − ρ1jk)2. (IV.2)
Thus, we want to solve the following optimization problem:
H(X|E)↓ρα(m) = min{ρijk}H(X|E)ρα
sub. to M↑α ≥ m ; ρ0jk ≥ ρ1jk ;
∑
ijk
ρijk = 1, (IV.3)
where the second constraint is given in (19) and where m ≥ 2√2, otherwise the conditional entropy is null (see figure 1
of the paper). Because of the symmetry of the problem, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the largest element in {ρijk} is
ρ000. Then, a necessary condition such that M↑α ≥ 2
√
2 is given by ρ000 ≥ 1/2. Indeed, the following upper bound
onM↑α:
M↑α = 4
√√√√ 1∑
j,k=0
(ρ0jk − ρ1jk)2 ≤ 4
√√√√ 1∑
j,k=0
ρ20jk ≤ 4
√√√√ 1∑
j,k=0
ρ000 · ρ0jk = 4
√√√√√ρ000
 1∑
j,k=0
ρ0jk
 ≤ 4√ρ000, (IV.4)
is greater than or equal to 2
√
2 when ρ000 ≥ 1/2.
Note that, by definition, the minimal entropy H(X|E)↓ρα(m) in (IV.3) is monotonically increasing in m.
The upper bound on the maximal MABK violation (IV.2) is tight on the following class of states (the tightness
conditions (75) are verified):
τ(ν) = ν|ψ0,0,0〉〈ψ0,0,0 |+(1− ν)|ψ0,1,1〉〈ψ0,1,1 |, (IV.5)
and reads in this case
Mτ (ν) =M↑τ (ν) =4
√
ν2 + (1− ν)2. (IV.6)
It is straightforward to verify that
Mτ (ρ000) ≥M↑α ∀ {ρijk}. (IV.7)
Moreover, the entropy (IV.1) evaluated on the states (IV.5) reads:
H(X|E)τ (ν) = 1− h(ν), (IV.8)
where we used the binary entropy h(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). Here and in the following, “ log” represents the
logarithm in base 2.
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By definition, the entropy minimized over all the states withM↑α ≥ m (IV.3) is upper bounded by the entropy of
any particular state withM↑α = m:
H(X|E)↓ρα(m) ≤ H(X|E)τ (νm) (IV.9)
where νm is fixed such that the maximal violation of the state τ(νm) is given by m:
M↑τ (νm) = 4
√
ν2m + (1− νm)2 = m. (IV.10)
On the other hand, in the following we prove that:
H(X|E)ρα ≥ H(X|E)τ (ρ000) ∀ {ρijk}, (IV.11)
where ρ000 ≥ 1/2 is the largest element in {ρijk}. In particular, the last expression holds for the state ρ∗α which is the
solution of the minimization in (IV.3):
H(X|E)↓ρα(m) = H(X|E)ρ∗α ≥ H(X|E)τ (ρ∗000)
≥ H(X|E)τ (νm). (IV.12)
The last inequality in (IV.12) is due to a couple of observations. Firstly, by applying (IV.7) to the state ρ∗α we obtain
Mτ (ρ∗000) ≥ m, which combined with (IV.10) implies that ρ∗000 ≥ νm (in the interval of interest ρ∗000, νm ≥ 1/2).
Then, we observe that the entropy of the states τ in (IV.8) is monotonically increasing in the interval ν ∈ [1/2, 1].
The two observations lead to the second inequality in (IV.12).
By combining (IV.12) with (IV.9), we obtain the desired lower bound:
H(X|E)↓ρα(m) = H(X|E)τ (νm). (IV.13)
Note that the family of states τ(ν) in (IV.5) minimizes the entropy for every observed violation m. The bound in
(IV.13) can be expressed in terms of the violation m by reverting (IV.10) and by using it in (IV.8), thus obtaining
Eq. (27) of the paper.
The derived bound is tight since, for every violation m, there exists a state τ(νm) (where νm is defined in (IV.10))
such that its entropy coincides with the derived lower bound (IV.13) and such that it can yield an MABK violation
equal to m. Indeed, we stated that for the family τ(ν) the upper boundM↑τ is tight (IV.6), i.e. there exists a set of
measurements that attain the violationM↑τ .
We are thus left to prove the inequality in (IV.11), which can be recast as follows:
h(ρ000) +H({ρijk + ρij¯k¯})−H({ρijk}) ≥ 0. (IV.14)
To start with, we simplify the difference of the following entropies:
h(ρ000)−H({ρijk}) = −(1− ρ000) log(1− ρ000) +
∑
(i,j,k)6=(0,0,0)
ρijk log ρijk. (IV.15)
By substituting (IV.15) into the l.h.s. of (IV.14), we get:
H(X|E)ρα −H(X|E)τ (ρ000) =
H({ρijk + ρij¯k¯}) +
∑
(i,j,k)6=(0,0,0)
ρijk log ρijk − (1− ρ000) log(1− ρ000). (IV.16)
We then apply Jensen’s inequality
f(x+ y) ≥ f(2x) + f(2y)
2
, (IV.17)
where f(x) = −x log x is a concave function, to the last three terms of the first entropy in (IV.16):
H({ρijk + ρij¯k¯}) = −(ρ000 + ρ011) log(ρ000 + ρ011)− (ρ001 + ρ010) log(ρ001 + ρ010)
− (ρ100 + ρ111) log(ρ100 + ρ111)− (ρ101 + ρ110) log(ρ101 + ρ110), (IV.18)
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such that we get
H({ρijk + ρij¯k¯}) ≥ −(ρ000 + ρ011) log(ρ000 + ρ011) +
∑
(i,j,k)6= (0,0,0)
(0,1,1)
−ρijk log(2ρijk)
=− (ρ000 + ρ011) log(ρ000 + ρ011)− (1− ρ000 − ρ011) +
∑
(i,j,k) 6= (0,0,0)
(0,1,1)
−ρijk log ρijk. (IV.19)
With this result, the difference of entropies in (IV.16) can be estimated by
H(X|E)ρα −H(X|E)τ (ρ000) ≥
− (ρ000 + ρ011) log(ρ000 + ρ011)− (1− ρ000) log(2(1− ρ000)) + ρ011 log(2ρ011)
=: g(ρ000, ρ011). (IV.20)
In the function g the first two terms are positive and the last is negative. We further analyze and estimate the function
g(x, y) in the range of interest, i.e. 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1−x. In this range g(x, y) is concave in x because its second
derivative is always negative:
∂2 g(x, y)
∂ x2
=− 1
ln(2)
(
1
(1− x) +
1
(x+ y)
)
< 0. (IV.21)
Consider the boundary x+y = 1 of g(x, y) for which we get g(1−y, y) = 0. Due to the concavity it holds for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
that:
g
(
p
1
2
+ (1− p)(1− y), y
)
≥ pg
(
1
2
, y
)
+ (1− p)g(1− y, y),
or equivalently that:
g(x, y) ≥
(
1− x− y
1
2 − y
)
g
(
1
2
, y
)
. (IV.22)
Note that from the parameter regimes of x and y it follows that
0 ≤
(
1− x− y
1
2 − y
)
≤ 1. (IV.23)
We finally analyze the properties of g( 12 , y), which is convex in y as its second derivative is always positive:
∂2 g( 12 , y)
∂ y2
=
1
y ln(2) + y2 ln(4)
> 0. (IV.24)
A convex function has a unique minimum if it exists in the parameter regime. In our case this is given by:
∂ g( 12 , y)
∂ y
= log(2y)− log(1
2
+ y)
!
= 0 ⇔ y = 1
2
(IV.25)
for which g( 12 ,
1
2 ) = 0 holds. Thus in general it holds:
g
(
1
2
, y
)
≥ 0. (IV.26)
By combining these considerations we obtain the desired inequality (IV.11):
H(X|E)ρα −H(X|E)τ (ρ000)
(IV.20)
≥ g(ρ000, ρ011)
(IV.22)
≥
(
1− ρ000 − ρ011
1
2 − ρ011
)
g
(
1
2
, ρ011
)
≥ 0, (IV.27)
where in the last inequality we used the fact that the pre-factor is positive (IV.23) and that g( 12 , ρ011) is lower bounded
by zero (IV.26).
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V. ANALYTICAL PROOF OF THE LOWER BOUND ON H(XY |E)ρα
In order to derive an analytical lower bound on H(XY |E)ρα , we employ the same argument used in minimizing
H(X|E)ρα and perform the optimization over the eigenvalues {ρijk} of ρα and over the parameter q given in (18).
This implies that we want to solve the following optimization problem:
H(XY |E)↓ρα(m) = min{ρijk,q,ϕA,ϕB}H(XY |E)ρα
sub. to M↑α ≥ m ; ρ0jk ≥ ρ1jk ;
∑
ijk
ρijk = 1, (V.1)
whereM↑α is the upper bound on the MABK violation derived in the Methods section (see (IV.2)), while ϕA and ϕB
determine the unknown measurement directions of Alice and Bob in the (x, y)-plane.
Eve is assumed to hold the purifying system E of the state ρα shared by Alice, Bob and Charlie. The purification
of ρα can thus be written as follows:
|φαABCE〉 =
∑
ijk
√
ρijk |ρijk〉 ⊗ |eijk〉 , (V.2)
where |ρijk〉 are the eigenstates of ρα defined in (17), while {|eijk〉} is an orthonormal basis of Eve’s eight-dimensional
Hilbert space E.
We restrict our proof to states ρα with a non-negative off-diagonal term s ≥ 0, which corresponds to q ≥ 0.
The complementary case corresponds to states ρ∗α which would lead to the same result. For this, we employ a
parametrization of the eigenstates slightly different from (17), which reads as follows:
|ρijk〉 = |ψijk〉 , for (j, k) 6= (1, 1)
|ρ011〉 =
√
(1− p) |ψ011〉 − i√p |ψ111〉
|ρ111〉 =√p |ψ011〉+ i
√
(1− p) |ψ111〉 ,
(V.3)
where |ψijk〉 are the GHZ basis states (Definition 1) and where p is completely fixed by q through the relation:
p =
q2
1 + q2
, (V.4)
from which we deduce that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and that p = 0 when q = 0.
From now on, we omit the subscript ρα in the entropy symbol for ease of notation. We thus have that the conditional
entropy H(XY |E) can be expressed as:
H(XY |E) =H(XY ) +H(E|XY )−H(E)
=2 +H(E|XY )−H({ρijk}). (V.5)
where the last equation follows from the fact that all marginals have been symmetrized and from the fact that the
state on ABCE is pure (V.2), thus H(E) = H(ABC) = H({ρijk}).
The proof of the analytical lower bound on H(XY |E) as a function of the MABK violation is subdivided in three
parts: (i) we first derive an analytical expression for H(E|XY ); (ii) we minimize H(E|XY ) with respect to q, ϕA
and ϕB ; (iii) we proceed minimizing the resulting expression in (V.5) given a certain MABK violation. Note that we
are allowed to minimize H(E|XY ) over q, ϕA and ϕB independently of H(E), since the latter is independent of the
mentioned optimization variables.
Step 1 - Analytical expression for H(E|XY ):
In order to derive the analytical expression for H(E|XY ), we will use the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. It holds that
H(E|XY ) = H(C|XY ). (V.6)
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the state shared by Charlie and Eve conditioned on the outcomes X = a of
Alice and Y = b of Bob, is a pure state. Indeed, if projective measurements are applied to a pure state, the resulting
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state, conditioned on a specific outcome, remains pure. Moreover, for a pure state, the entropies of its subsystems are
equal, which implies
H(E|X=a, Y =b) = H(C|X=a, Y =b) (V.7)
Therefore
H(E|XY ) =
∑
a,b
Pr(a, b)H(E|X = a, Y = b) (V.8)
=
∑
a,b
Pr(a, b)H(C|X = a, Y = b) (V.9)
= H(C|XY ). (V.10)
This Lemma is of great use as Eve’s system is described by an eight-dimensional Hilbert space, whereas Charlie is
only in possession of a single qubit. So the computation of H(C|XY ) is significantly simpler.
We obtain Charlie’s state, conditioned on the outcomes X = a and Y = b, by partially tracing over Eve’s degrees
of freedom
ραCab = TrE
(|φαCEab〉〈φαCEab |) , (V.11)
where |φαCEab〉 is the state of Charlie and Eve given that Alice and Bob obtain outcomes X = a and Y = b respectively,
which is determined by
[|a〉〈a|⊗|b〉〈b|⊗idCE ] [|φαABCE〉〈φαABCE |] [|a〉〈a|⊗|b〉〈b|⊗idCE ] =
1
4
|a〉〈a|⊗|b〉〈b|⊗|φαCEab〉〈φαCEab |. (V.12)
The projected state |φαCEab〉 can be computed using the definition of the purification given in Eq. (V.2), the definition
of the eigenstates in Eq. (V.3), and the fact that the measurements performed by Alice and Bob have been restricted
to the (x, y)-plane. Indeed, the measurements are defined by the projectors in (32) of the main text, that we report
here:
|a〉X =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)aeiϕA |1〉) a ∈ {0, 1}
|b〉Y =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)beiϕB |1〉) b ∈ {0, 1}. (V.13)
In the following we abbreviate ξa = (−1)aeiϕA and ξb = (−1)beiϕB . We then have that
|φαCEab〉 =
∑
ljk
jk 6=11
1√
2
(
(δ0j + δ1jξb) |k〉+ (δ0j¯ξa + δ1j¯ξaξb)(−1)l |k¯〉
)⊗ |eljk〉√ρljk
+
((√
(1− p)− i√p
)
ξb |1〉+
(√
(1− p) + i√p
)
ξa |0〉
)
⊗ |e011〉√ρ011
+
((√
p+ i
√
(1− p)
)
ξb |1〉+
(√
p− i
√
(1− p)
)
ξa |0〉
)
⊗ |e111〉√ρ111.
(V.14)
Finally, the partial trace over Eve results in
ραCab =TrE
(|φαCEab〉〈φαCEab |) (V.15)
=
 ∑
ljk
jk 6=11
1√
2
(
(δ0j + δ1jξb) |k〉+ (δ0j¯ξa + δ1j¯ξaξb)(−1)l |k¯〉
) · (h.c.) ρljk
+
((√
(1− p)− i√p
)
ξb |1〉+
(√
(1− p) + i√p
)
ξa |0〉
)
· (h.c.) ρ011
+
((√
p+ i
√
(1− p)
)
ξb |1〉+
(√
p− i
√
(1− p)
)
ξa |0〉
)
· (h.c.) ρ111.
(V.16)
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As ραCab is a qubit state, we can now analytically calculate its eigenvalues, which can be reduced to
λ1,2(ρ
α
Cab
) =
1
2
(1± |C|) , (V.17)
where:
C = (ρ000 − ρ100) ξ2a + (ρ001 − ρ101)
(
ξ2b
)∗
+ (ρ010 − ρ110) ξ2a
(
ξ2b
)∗
+ (ρ011 − ρ111)
(
1− 2p− 2i
√
p(1− p)
)
= (ρ000 − ρ100) ei2ϕA + (ρ001 − ρ101) e−i2ϕB + (ρ010 − ρ110) ei2(ϕA−ϕB) + (ρ011 − ρ111) eiϕ3 ,
(V.18)
where ϕ3 is a function of the parameter p. We see that the eigenvalues do not depend on the measurement outcomes
a and b of Alice and Bob. The entropy is then given by
H(E|XY ) = H(C|XY ) = h
(
1
2
(1 + |C|)
)
, (V.19)
where h(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy.
Step 2 - Minimization of H(E|XY ):
Minimizing the binary entropy in (V.19), with respect to the measurement directions and the parameter p, is
equivalent to maximizing the largest eigenvalue of ραCab . The optimum can directly be deduced from Eq. (V.17). Since
it holds that (ρ0jk − ρ1jk) ≥ 0 ∀ j, k, the largest eigenvalue is maximized if
ei2ϕA = e−i2ϕB = ei2(ϕA−ϕB) = eiϕ3 , (V.20)
which holds e.g. for ϕA = ϕB = ϕ3 = 0. Since ϕ3 = 0 implies p = q = 0, we verified that even in the minimization of
the conditional entropy of two parties’ outcomes, H(XY |E), it is optimal for Eve to distribute a GHZ-diagonal state
which Alice and Bob measure in the X basis. The largest eigenvalue is then given by
λmax =
∑
jk
ρ0jk, (V.21)
where we used normalization of the eigenvalues to eliminate the terms ρ1jk. The lower bound on the conditional
entropy H(E|XY ) is thus given by
H(E|XY ) ≥h
∑
jk
ρ0jk
 . (V.22)
Step 3 - Minimization of H(XY |E) with given MABK violation:
Using the result of Step 2 in (V.5), we can concentrate on minimizing the following expression:
H(E|XY )−H(E) ≥h
∑
jk
ρ0jk
−H({ρijk}) (V.23)
=−
∑
jk
ρ0jk
 log
∑
jk
ρ0jk
−
∑
jk
ρ1jk
 log
∑
jk
ρ1jk
+∑
ijk
ρijk log ρijk (V.24)
=p0
∑
jk
ρ0jk
p0
log
ρ0jk
p0
+ (1− p0)
∑
jk
ρ1jk
(1− p0) log
ρ1jk
(1− p0) (V.25)
=− p0H
({
ρ0jk
p0
})
− (1− p0)H
({
ρ1jk
(1− p0)
})
, (V.26)
where we abbreviated the probability p0 :=
∑
jk ρ0jk. We now use the concavity of the Shannon entropy over
probability distributions ~u and ~v, i.e.
p0H(~u) + (1− p0)H(~v) ≤ H(p0~u+ (1− p0)~v), (V.27)
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to get
H(E|XY )−H(E) ≥− p0H
({
ρ0jk
p0
})
− (1− p0)H
({
ρ1jk
(1− p0)
})
(V.28)
≥−H ({ρ0jk + ρ1jk}) . (V.29)
With the lower bound obtained in (V.29), the optimization problem we have to solve is now the following:
max
{ρijk}
H ({ρ0jk + ρ1jk})
sub. to
m2
16
≤
∑
jk
(ρ0jk − ρ1jk)2 ;
∑
ijk
ρijk = 1 ; ρijk ≥ 0,
(V.30)
where m is the observed MABK violation. Now notice that for every solution {ρ0jk, ρ1jk} of the maximization
problem, there exists another equivalent solution –i.e. that leads to the same value for H ({ρ0jk + ρ1jk})– of the form
{ρ′0jk = ρ0jk + ρ1jk, ρ′1jk = 0}. Therefore, we can restrict the optimization to the solutions of that form:
max
{ρ0jk}
H ({ρ0jk})
sub. to
m2
16
≤
∑
jk
ρ20jk∑
jk
ρ0jk = 1
ρ000 ≥ ρ001 ≥ ρ010 ≥ ρ011 ≥ 0,
(V.31)
where we imposed the ordering of the eigenvalues without loss of generality, since the optimization problem is sym-
metric with respect to their permutations.
We have thus reduced the problem to the constrained maximization of H ({ρ0jk}), as described in (V.31). In the
following calculations, we rescale the function H ({ρ0jk}) by ln 2, so that it is expressed in terms of natural logarithms
instead of the logarithm in base 2. This simplifies the notation when computing its derivatives but does not change
the solution of the optimization problem.
We use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multipliers method [70, 71] to identify necessary conditions for extremal points of
the optimization problem in (V.31). The Lagrangian for our maximization problem is then given by:
L(ρ000, ρ001, ρ010, ρ011, u, v) =H (ρ000, ρ001, ρ010, ρ011) + u
(
ρ2000 + ρ
2
001 + ρ
2
010 + ρ
2
011 −
m2
16
)
+ v (ρ000 + ρ001 + ρ010 + ρ011 − 1)
(V.32)
The necessary conditions to have an extremal point are given by the solution of the following system:
∇ρ0jkL = 0
ρ2000 + ρ
2
001 + ρ
2
010 + ρ
2
011 ≥ m
2
16
ρ000 + ρ001 + ρ010 + ρ011 = 1
u ≥ 0
u
(
ρ2000 + ρ
2
001 + ρ
2
010 + ρ
2
011 − m
2
16
)
= 0.
(V.33)
The last equation in (V.33) implies that either u = 0 or the inequality constraint holds with the equal sign. Let us
first consider the case that u = 0 and compute the derivative of L with respect to ρ0jk in the first equation of (V.33):
∂L
∂ρ0jk
= − ln ρ0jk + v − 1 = 0 ∀ ρ0jk. (V.34)
Since the logarithm is a monotonic function, the set of equations in the last expression imply one of the following
cases:
(a) ρ000 = ρ001 = ρ010 = ρ011,
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(b) ρ000 = ρ001 = ρ010 and ρ011 = 0,
(c) ρ000 = ρ001 and ρ010 = ρ011 = 0,
(d) ρ001 = ρ010 = ρ011 = 0.
where we accounted for the border conditions, i.e. when one or more ρ0jk are equal to zero.
By combining the equality conditions with the constraint that ρ0jk sum to one, we can easily obtain the solution of
the system (V.33) for each of the above cases. Note that the inequality constraint is still valid, therefore the derived
solutions will only hold for certain values of m:
(a) H({ρ0jk}) = 2, valid for m ≤ 2,
(b) H({ρ0jk}) = log 3, valid for m ≤ 4/
√
3
(c) H({ρ0jk}) = 1, valid for m ≤ 2
√
2
(d) H({ρ0jk}) = 0, valid for m ≤ 4.
The cases (a) and (d) are useless since the former is never valid in the range of interest for the observed violation
(i.e. above the classical bound), while the latter leads to zero entropy, which is definitely not the solution of our
maximization problem.
Let us consider now the case u > 0, which implies that the inequality constraint becomes an equality (the last
equation in (V.33) must be satisfied). We compute the derivatives in the first equation of (V.33):
∂L
∂ρ0jk
= 2ρ0jku− ln ρ0jk + v − 1 = 0 ∀ ρ0jk. (V.35)
Notice that the function g(x) = ax− lnx+ b can have at most two roots (zero points), because
g′(x) = a− 1
x
, (V.36)
has at most a single root (zero point), corresponding to one extremum for g(x). It follows that there can be at most
a single y 6= x such that g(x) = g(y) = 0. The potential critical points of the Lagrangian L are hence restricted to
the following cases (remember we use the ordering ρ000 ≥ ρ001 ≥ ρ010 ≥ ρ011 ≥ 0)
(i) ρ000 = ρ001 = ρ010 = ρ011,
(ii) ρ000 = ρ001 = ρ010 > ρ011,
(iii) ρ000 > ρ001 = ρ010 = ρ011,
(iv) ρ000 = ρ001 > ρ010 = ρ011.
We again account for the border conditions, and analog conditions directly follow in case some ρ0jk are zero:
(v) ρ000 = ρ001 = ρ010 and ρ011 = 0,
(vi) ρ000 = ρ001 > ρ010 and ρ011 = 0,
(vii) ρ000 > ρ001 = ρ010 and ρ011 = 0,
(viii) ρ000 > ρ001 and ρ010 = ρ011 = 0,
(ix) ρ000 = ρ001 and ρ010 = ρ011 = 0,
(x) ρ001 = ρ010 = ρ011 = 0.
Note that in all the listed cases there are a maximum of two distinct eigenvalues, which are thus completely fixed
by the two equality constraints. Moreover, we observe that the cases (i), (v), (ix) and (x) correspond to the already
investigated cases (a), (b), (c) and (d), respectively.
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Analysing the resulting entropy H as a function of the MABK violation m for each of the ten possible extremal
points, we conclude that the maximum is achieved for the case (iii) for every value of m. In this case, the eigenvalues
are fixed to:
ρ000 =
1
8
(
2 +
√
3
√
m2 − 4
)
=: νm (V.37)
ρ0jk =
(1− νm)
3
(j, k) 6= (0, 0). (V.38)
The solution of the optimization problem in (V.31) then reads:
H ({ρ0jk}) = H
({
νm,
1− νm
3
,
1− νm
3
,
1− νm
3
})
(V.39)
The lower bound on the entropy difference (V.29) is thus given by:
H(E|XY )−H(E) ≥ −H
({
νm,
1− νm
3
,
1− νm
3
,
1− νm
3
})
(V.40)
Finally we can lower bound the entropy of Alice and Bob’s outcomes given Eve’s quantum side information by
H(XY |E) = 2 +H(E|XY )−H(E) ≥ 2−H
({
νm,
1− νm
3
,
1− νm
3
,
1− νm
3
})
, (V.41)
with
νm =
1
4
+
√
3
8
√
m2 − 4. (V.42)
On the tightness of the bound:
Similarly to the bound on H(X|E) (section IV), we could identify a family of quantum states η(ν) defined as:
η(ν) = ν|ψ0,0,0〉〈ψ0,0,0 |+1− ν
3
∑
(j,k)6=(0,0)
|ψ0,j,k〉〈ψ0,j,k |, (V.43)
that attains the lower bound in (V.41) for every observed violationm. Indeed, the conditional entropyH(XY |E)η(νm)
computed on the state η(νm), where νm is given by (V.42), is equal to the r.h.s. of (V.41).
The upper boundM↑η on the MABK violation (IV.2) relative to the family of states (V.43) reads:
Mη(ν) = 4√
3
√
4ν2 − 2ν + 1, (V.44)
and for ν = νm it reduces to:
M↑η(νm) = m. (V.45)
Now, numerical computations suggest that the tightness conditions (75) of the MABK violation upper bound are in
general not satisfied by the states η(ν). In other words, there exist no measurements that the parties can perform on
η(ν) such that the violation of the MABK inequality reaches the value given by (V.44). In particular, when ν = νm,
there are no measurements such that the violation of value m is observed (due to Eq. V.45).
Therefore, although the states η(νm) are such that their entropy attains the lower bound (V.41) for a given observed
violation m, they do not prove the tightness of the bound since they cannot yield a violation of value m.
The tightness of the lower bound in (V.41) is still an open question.
